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THE SYMMETRY PRINCIPLE 
BRADLEY A. AREHEART* 
Abstract: Title VII provides symmetrical protection against discrimination in 
that both blacks and whites, and men and women may avail themselves of the 
law’s protections. In contrast, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act oper-
ates asymmetrically, shielding workers over the age of forty from discrimination 
yet offering no reciprocal protection for younger workers. Why do some antidis-
crimination laws protect symmetrically while others do not? More importantly, 
why does this design choice matter? These are questions that scholars, courts, 
and legislators have generally ignored. This Article proceeds in two parts. First, it 
identifies symmetry as an important, yet frequently overlooked, way in which 
American antidiscrimination laws differ. Second, it proposes the “symmetry 
principle” as a major normative theory for analyzing and evaluating the design of 
antidiscrimination laws. Symmetrical laws have unique expressive, tactical, and 
substantive strengths. For example, symmetrical laws promote solidarity, are 
more politically palatable, can more effectively challenge stereotypes, and are 
capacious enough to respond to unanticipated forms of bias. This Article defends 
symmetry as a default rule to be applied when addressing traits such as sex, age, 
and genetic information. To comprehensively combat discrimination, however, 
the law cannot rely exclusively on symmetry; rather, asymmetrical laws can un-
der certain circumstances be uniquely beneficial. Sometimes a trait is not univer-
sally held and is most intelligible as an asymmetric measure, such as in the case 
of disability. At other times, protecting symmetrically would mean giving advan-
taged groups a “reverse” cause of action that might further subordinate an al-
ready disadvantaged group, such as in the case of disability. Accordingly, this Ar-
ticle defends asymmetrical approaches to disability as well as several race-based 
policies and doctrines. Taken together, the symmetry principle is capable of 
imposing some degree of order on the wide-ranging policies and practices in 
antidiscrimination doctrine. In addition to addressing this previously neglected 
design choice, and considering how current laws might be modified to better pre-
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vent and rectify subordination, the symmetry principle and its analytical frame-
work may also assist future legislative bodies in crafting new antidiscrimination 
measures that are directed toward formerly unprotected groups.  
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) de-
termined that sexual orientation discrimination is, by its very nature, discrimi-
nation “because of sex.”1 Less than a year later, the EEOC filed two lawsuits 
challenging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the private sec-
tor.2 These breakthroughs were the result of nearly three decades of evolution 
in the interpretation of Title VII,3 beginning with Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins.4 
The text of Title VII protects against discrimination on the basis of “sex,” 
and for the first couple of decades this was understood unambiguously as bio-
logical sex.5 Courts interpreted the statute to protect against the relatively sim-
ple act of preferring men over women—or vice versa.6 But Hopkins dramati-
cally expanded the protection of simple sex discrimination to provide recourse 
for the more complex phenomenon of sex-based stereotyping.7 This innovation 
meant that masculine women and effeminate men now had a cause of action 
not just for discrimination due to their sex, but also for discrimination due to 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Baldwin, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, Agency No. 2012-24738-FAA-03 (July 15, 2015).  
 2 See Press Release, Equal Emp’t. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Files First Suits Challenging 
Sexual Orientation Discrimination as Sex Discrimination (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/newsroom/release/3-1-16.cfm [https://perma.cc/BJL8-NMHX] (stressing the “critical” im-
portance of all U.S. courts recognizing the right of individuals to not be discriminated against in 
workplaces because of their sexual orientation). 
 3 See generally KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, GENDER NONCONFORMITY AND THE LAW (2016) (dis-
cussing the evolution of U.S. sex discrimination jurisprudence during the twenty-first century). 
 4 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (finding Title VII allows women to 
escape “an intolerable and impermissible catch 22” where possessing a trait, such as aggressiveness, 
may be both essential to professional success and grounds for dismissal at the whim of a prejudiced 
employer). 
 5 See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145, 156 (1976) (holding discrimination based 
on sex referred only to “traditional” practices that divided men and women along the axis of biological 
sex); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661–63 (9th Cir. 1977) (dismissing claim by 
transgender appellant on basis that “Congress had only the traditional notions of ‘sex’ in mind” when 
it passed Title VII). 
 6 See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding the plain 
meaning of Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination impliedly applies to both men and women); 
Holloway, 556 F.2d at 663 (asserting that Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination was meant to 
ensure equality of men and women, unless there was a “bona fide relationship between” job qualifica-
tions and an employee’s sex). 
 7 See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 250 (stating that where an employee’s gender would be cited as a 
factor in an employer’s hiring choice, the Court would find “that gender played a motivating part” in 
that employer’s decision). 
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their gender.8 In other words, even if an employer did not generally discrimi-
nate against women, that employer could still be liable for sex discrimination if 
it discriminated against women who did not fit certain gender norms.9 Addi-
tionally, since Hopkins was decided, nearly all federal courts have come to 
recognize that transgender discrimination is also sex discrimination based on 
sex stereotyping.10 Furthermore, gay and lesbian individuals have sometimes 
found a safe harbor in Title VII’s protections for gender non-conformance.11 
All of these developments further the antidiscrimination project by breaking 
down sex-related stereotypes and barriers to opportunity. 
These advances would not have been possible without a structural mech-
anism in the law, hidden in plain sight, which this Article identifies as the 
“symmetry principle.” Had Title VII been crafted narrowly to protect only 
women, it would never have reached some of the unanticipated and emerging 
forms of bias outlined above. Instead, Congress drafted the statute broadly and 
symmetrically to prohibit discrimination on the basis of “sex.” This equanimity 
in protection for men and women has allowed Title VII the elasticity to protect 
various permutations of gender and sex. Such symmetrical breadth has kept the 
statute timely and relevant in grappling with emerging iterations of sex-based 
animus. 
This Article advances the symmetry principle as a new heuristic for un-
derstanding the design of antidiscrimination laws and, in turn, analyzing their 
effectiveness. The symmetry principle mandates that once certain attributes or 
characteristics are identified as worthy of antidiscrimination protection, all 
groups within that universal ground must be protected. For example, Title VII 
protects the universal trait of race, and it does so for all groups, including not 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See, e.g., Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that Hopkins “applies with equal force to a man who is discriminated against for acting too femi-
nine”). See generally Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: 
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995) (arguing for 
robust protection of “gender” under Title VII). 
 9 Though many people use “sex” and “gender” interchangeably, feminists have distinguished 
between the terms since the late 1960s,
 
when they appropriated the term “gender” to emphasize the 
socially constructed nature of sex and counter the viewpoint that biology is destiny. Toril Moi, What 
Is a Woman? Sex, Gender, and the Body in Feminist Theory, in WHAT IS A WOMAN? AND OTHER 
ESSAYS 3, 5 (2001); Mari Mikkola, Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender, STANFORD ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF PHIL. (Jan. 29, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-gender/ [https://perma.cc/
M8PW-EZ3E]. 
 10 Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317–18, 1318 n.5 (11th Cir. 2011); see, e.g., Barnes v. 
Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737, 738 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding plaintiff who did not conform to sex stere-
otypes had established prima facie sex discrimination claim). 
 11 Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 359, 402–07 (2004). Often, however, 
it can be impossible to separate out the bias due to sexual orientation versus gender-nonconformance. 
Id. at 403–04. Moreover, gender non-conformance is often still not protected where it conflicts with 
an employer-imposed dress, appearance, or grooming code. YURACKO, supra note 3, at 2–8. 
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only blacks and Hispanics, but also whites—a traditionally favored group.12 
Conversely, while discrimination laws protect those the law identifies as disa-
bled, it does not protect those without legally cognizable disabilities.13 Such a 
discrimination law is asymmetrical. 
In addition to teasing out the key differences between symmetry and 
asymmetry, this Article offers a theory about what those different categories 
accomplish, and what they reflect about our national commitment to antidis-
crimination. The symmetry principle is simple, yet unappreciated in the litera-
ture as a systematic explanation for how we fashion laws that prevent and pro-
vide recourse for subordination.14 The tenor of the “protectorate”15—or the 
protected classes in aggregate—is symmetry. 
Symmetrical discrimination laws have many strengths: expressively, in 
promoting solidarity while retaining the moorings of antidiscrimination cate-
gories;16 tactically, in securing the political capital necessary for implementa-
tion as well as maintaining support through the use of a trait that all people 
                                                                                                                           
 12 This is because, in most factual instances and applications, the law concludes that members of 
different racial groups are all similarly situated. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2423 (1994) (noting “the law operates as a ban on formal inequality of the sort 
that prohibits most explicit distinctions between men and women or blacks and whites”). 
 13 But see infra notes 66–75 and accompanying text (noting the circumstances under which peo-
ple without disabilities are protected under the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 14 Although one author has recently written on the topic of symmetry, the author does so only in 
the context of four traits (race, sex, age, and disability) and principally through a different lens (labor 
economics), and reaches a different conclusion altogether (symmetry is always warranted for discrim-
ination laws). See generally Naomi Schoenbaum, The Case for Symmetry in Antidiscrimination Law, 
2017 WISC. L. REV. 69. In contrast, this Article addresses a full range of traits (in both statutory and 
constitutional law), applies a variety of lenses (including expressive, tactical, substantive, and philo-
sophical), and concludes that both symmetrical and asymmetrical protections are warranted, depend-
ing upon the respective traits and circumstances. Several other scholars have invoked the terms 
“symmetry” or “asymmetry” to make a more limited point. E.g., William R. Corbett, Babbling About 
Employment Discrimination: Does the Master Builder Understand the Blueprint for the Great Tower, 
12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 683, 686–92 (2010) (arguing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 created some asymme-
tries between the proof structures for Title VII and the ADEA); Barbara Flagg & Katherine Goldwas-
ser, Fighting for Truth, Justice, and the Asymmetrical Way, 76 WASH U. L. Q. 105, 108 (1998) (out-
lining the contexts in which they advocate “asymmetrical legal doctrines”); Christine A. Littleton, 
Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1296 (1987) (proposing her own path to 
sexual equality, which she identifies as “essentially asymmetrical”); Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating 
Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 168–70 (2011) (writing on “[t]he [p]roblem of 
[s]ymmetry” in the equal protection context); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protec-
tion: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 558–68 
(1998) (characterizing two approaches to equal protection as “symmetrical” and “asymmetrical” and 
ultimately favoring the implicitly-asymmetrical “political powerlessness”). 
 15 “Protectorate” was a term coined by Owen Fiss and refers to the beneficiaries of discrimination 
lawthose who discrimination law protects. Owen M. Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has 
Come: Anti-Discrimination Law in the Second Law After Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 742, 748–52 (1974). 
 16 See infra notes 128–162 and accompanying text. 
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share;17 and substantively, in robustly attacking discrimination while avoiding 
the impossibly complex issue of forecasting which groups will require protec-
tion in the future—a virtue this article terms “adaptive breadth.”18 
Symmetrical laws, however, also have weaknesses along all three of these 
lines.19 In the wake of Donald Trump’s election to the U.S. presidency, espe-
cially, one might question whether symmetrical antidiscrimination norms are 
just a way of reconsolidating power and enervating the sense that certain 
groups are more subordinated than others. For example, some scholars have 
critiqued racial symmetry under Equal Protection doctrine by arguing that 
treating state actions that impact race equivalently simply preserves racial hi-
erarchies.20 Further, some opponents of symmetrical laws have critiqued them 
as providing only formal equality, on the theory that parceling out legal bene-
fits according to egalitarian distributive principles may not result in just out-
comes.21 They argue, in effect, that symmetry is fair in form, but not result.22 
The symmetry principle may call to mind other ongoing scholarly dia-
logues and theories regarding why and how we protect against discrimination. 
These theories include anticlassification,23 antisubordination,24 antibalkaniza-
tion,25 and universalism.26 The symmetry principle is not coextensive with an-
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 163–223 and accompanying text.  
 18 See infra notes 224–272 and accompanying text.  
 19 See infra notes 128–308 and accompanying text. 
 20 E.g., Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1620–21 (2009) (categorizing Chief 
Justice Roberts’s Parents Involved opinion that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race 
is to stop discriminating on the basis of race” as a perfect example of his moral-equivalence stance). 
 21 Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Work-
place Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1144 (1986). 
 22 See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the 
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 993–1001 (1993) (arguing against the 
current symmetrical treatment of race under the Equal Protection Clause and in favor of employing 
heightened scrutiny only when a facially neutral practice disadvantages non-whites); Reva B. Siegel, 
“The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119–220 (1996) 
(arguing that facial neutrality of a race- or gender-specific law may mask the nature of the harm they 
are inflicting). 
 23 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Dis-
course Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 78 (2000) (noting the 
distinction between anticlassification and antisubordination has dominated arguments for over two 
decades). 
 24 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 
157 (1976) (arguing the Equal Protection Clause proscribes laws or official practices that “aggravate 
the subordinate position of [a specially disadvantaged group]”); Barbara J. Flagg, Enduring Principle: 
On Race, Process, and Constitutional Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 960 (1994) (explaining the princi-
ple of antisubordination maintains that specific groups of people should not be deemed “socially, 
culturally, or materially” inferior to other groups). 
 25 See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Deci-
sion in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1280–86 (2011) (articulating the principle of anti-
balkanization in the context of equal protection jurisprudence). 
 26 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After Shel-
by), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2847 (2014) (“[U]niversalistic approaches to civil rights problems have had 
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ticlassification27 or these other theories and, as illustrated in Part II, harnesses a 
unique mix of their strengths. This makes the symmetry principle a critical, 
though underappreciated, part of understanding equality in the antidiscrimina-
tion tradition. 
Ultimately, this Article argues that discrimination law needs both sym-
metrical and asymmetrical approaches to comprehensively combat discrimina-
tion. If symmetry is a default rule, this Article insists upon asymmetrical ex-
ceptions and attempts to delineate the principles under which asymmetry is 
warranted. The case for symmetry is strongest where traits are universally 
held, such as in the case of sex and age. At other times, the zero-sum impact of 
protecting symmetrically is an affront to equality, justifying asymmetry. For 
example, disparate impact jurisprudence and some race-based measures under 
the Equal Protection Clause involve intrinsic zero-sum tradeoffs that may war-
rant asymmetric treatment. This Article thus defends asymmetrical approaches 
for disability and certain race-based measures, including affirmative action.28 
If the Holy Grail for antidiscrimination theory is a “coherent normative foun-
dation upon which discrimination law can securely rest,”29 the symmetry prin-
ciple is one step further in the refinement of that goal.30 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I defines the symmetry principle 
and argues that symmetry is a defining feature of discrimination law.31 Part II 
                                                                                                                           
many influential advocates in recent years”); e.g., Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: Ameri-
can Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1341–55 (2012) (ar-
guing in favor of “extra-discrimination remedies” that would protect everyone against discrimination); 
Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1037, 1037–38 (1996) 
(arguing for class-based affirmative action to address the legacy of discrimination); Kenji Yoshino, 
The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748–49 (2011) (defending a universalistic ap-
proach to the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 27 Part I.C explains in detail the difference between symmetry and anticlassification (infra notes 
94–121 and accompanying text), but one quick example illustrates the distinction. While disparate 
impact is in clear contradiction with anticlassification principles (since it requires people to be classi-
fied into racial groups, with liability hinging on how the statuses of those groups compare), disparate 
impact protects all groups, which makes the protection plainly symmetrical. 
 28 See infra notes 273–308 and accompanying text. 
 29 TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 6 (2015). 
 30 That a coherent normative foundation is the Holy Grail for antidiscrimination theory is evi-
denced by the scores of books and articles that have been written to unearth such a foundation. See 
generally JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2014); DEBO-
RAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? (2008); PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DIS-
CRIMINATION LAW (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 2013); ROBERT POST ET AL., PREJUDI-
CIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW (2001); ALEXANDER 
SOMEK, ENGINEERING EQUALITY: AN ESSAY ON EUROPEAN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW (2011); 
Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes and 
Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1992); Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination 
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); Sophia Moreau, What Is Discrimination?, 38 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 143 (2010); Sunstein, supra note 12 (proposing an “anticaste principle” as a foundational means 
to interpret equality). 
 31 See infra notes 35–121 and accompanying text. 
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examines and systematizes the strengths and weaknesses of symmetrical dis-
crimination laws.32 Part III then explains how and under what circumstances 
an asymmetrical protectorate may better achieve equality.33 Part IV briefly ex-
amines several laws, which are rightly or wrongly formulated and, in turn, 
considers what the symmetry principle may tell us about the future of the pro-
tectorate.34 
I. SYMMETRY AND ASYMMETRY IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 
A. A Working Definition of Symmetry 
The tenor of discrimination law is symmetry, which is illuminated 
through examination of the design of such measures. Generally, discrimination 
law prohibits certain acts, or mandates other acts, when they are connected to 
certain attributes or grounds.35 Beyond that, there is a structural design choice 
when it comes to defining the protected class to encompass only one group or 
protecting “all people along a certain axis of identity.”36 This puts groups and 
grounds at the center of how best to define the protectorate.37 
This Article defines a paradigmatically symmetrical approach to discrimi-
nation law as one where all groups within a universal ground are protected by 
the law. Conversely, a purely asymmetrical approach is one where only some 
groups within a universal ground are protected. 
In a recent book, Professor Tarunabh Khaitan constructs a painstakingly 
theoretical defense of discrimination law.38 While symmetry is not the focus of 
his book, he briefly posits that discrimination law is “largely asymmetrical” in 
that disadvantaged groups “benefit” or receive “greater protection” than rela-
tively advantaged groups.39 Khaitan thus characterizes discrimination laws as 
asymmetrical using an “as-applied” frame, or by focusing on the distributive 
effects of such laws.40 
This Article instead contends that the facial protection (or not) of certain 
groups is a better way of thinking about symmetry in the antidiscrimination 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See infra notes 122–272 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 273–309 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 310–349 and accompanying text. 
 35 KHAITAN, supra note 29, at 29. 
 36 Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the 
ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399, 464–65 (2006) (discussing the ADA’s rationale for protecting only those with 
disability, in comparison to Title VII, which protects all those discriminated against on the basis of 
sex or race). 
 37 KHAITAN, supra note 29, at 62. 
 38 See generally id. (fleshing out his theory of antidiscrimination law as based in groups and 
grounds distinctions). 
 39 Id. at 61–62 (contending discrimination law is largely asymmetric). 
 40 Id. at 40 (positing that discrimination law’s benefits are asymmetrically distributed among 
social groups). 
2017] The Symmetry Principle 1093 
context, and for several reasons. First, under Khaitan’s theory, a law could 
never really be symmetrical since certain groups will always make more use 
than others of any particular discrimination law. Second, Khaitan’s categoriza-
tion of certain laws would require an empirical judgment about who is making 
the most use of certain protections; but his project is admittedly non-
empirical.41 Moreover, determining whether certain groups make more use of 
certain laws would always be fraught with peril since there are different ways 
to think about deriving benefits from such laws. Would we measure the benefit 
derived by how many lawsuits certain groups file, what percentage of those 
cases get settled or won, or by analyzing the expressive benefits from such 
laws? Under Khaitan’s formulation, there is no obvious bright-line means for 
determining whether a law is symmetrical or asymmetrical. 
Further, to the extent we are concerned about the benefit or distributive 
effect of such laws, we should primarily be concerned with the perceived bene-
fit or distributive effect.42 As Part III indicates, many benefits of symmetrical 
laws do not depend upon how such laws actually get used.43 This is because 
while the people who are responsible for acting on antidiscrimination man-
dates will likely be informed about the basic provisions of discrimination laws, 
they are unlikely to have (or acquire) actual information about the probability 
of a lawsuit or other costs.44 Accordingly, while it may be important (for ex-
pressive and tactical benefits) whether society in general, and employers in 
particular, perceive that certain groups make disproportionate usage of certain 
laws, “usage” or “benefiting” is a non-optimal basis for categorizing discrimi-
nation laws as symmetrical or asymmetrical.45 
Khaitan’s aims are admittedly different, broader,46 and he is not focused 
on analyzing symmetry in any systematic way. Still, thinking about the bene-
fits and costs of symmetry establishes that facial—and not “as applied”—
symmetry is a better basis for establishing a new normative theory. The next 
section will establish concretely that the symmetry principle is a defining fea-
ture of American antidiscrimination law. 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Id. at 124 (stating his project is “theoretical rather than empirical”). 
 42 Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 91. 
 43 See infra notes 273–309 and accompanying text. 
 44 Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 90–92. 
 45 Even perceived usage can be difficult to judge, due to availability heuristics and always chang-
ing demographics. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998) (explaining that the “availability heuristic” is misleading in that one’s 
perceived frequency of an occurrence is based solely upon the ease of recalling similar occurrences). 
 46 For example, he is looking at the law from five common law jurisdictions. KHAITAN, supra 
note 29, at 1–19. 
1094 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1085 
B. Identifying Symmetry and Asymmetry 
Symmetry is a firmly rooted principle in discrimination laws.47 The most 
prominent illustration of the symmetry principle is Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (Title VII).48 Title VII protects people from employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, and national origin, and it gen-
erally does so for all groups within each of these universal grounds. Title VII’s 
legislative history notes its intent to “cover white men and white women and 
all Americans”49—an intent which has been demonstrated repeatedly in case 
law. For example, Title VII has been interpreted to prohibit race discrimination 
against majority group members,50 sex discrimination against men,51 color dis-
crimination against those who are white,52 and national origin discrimination 
against those born in America.53 
Even the one protection of Title VII that appears to be limited—
religion—is nearly symmetrical in that it protects almost everyone from dis-
crimination on that basis. The statute defines religion to include “all aspects of 
religious observance and practice, as well as belief.”54 But the EEOC defines 
religious practices to “include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and 
wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious be-
liefs.”55 The result is that one is not required to be “religious” in any conven-
tional way in order to be protected under Title VII. The law has been interpret-
ed to protect white supremacists,56 atheists,57 and witches.58 Title VII’s protec-
                                                                                                                           
 47 Cf. Corbett, supra note 14, at 689–91 (arguing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 created asymme-
tries in the proof structures for different discrimination laws). 
 48 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012 & Supp. 2017)). 
 49 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler). 
 50 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 286 (1976) (rejecting the argument that 
white citizens are not protected by Title VII). 
 51 See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (finding Title VII’s 
protection against sex discrimination applies equally to men and women). 
 52 “Everyone is protected from race and color discrimination[:] Whites, Blacks, Asians, Latinos, 
Arabs, American Indians, Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians, Pacific Islanders, persons of more than 
one race, and all other persons, whatever their race, color, or ethnicity.” Questions and Answers About 
Race and Color Discrimination in Employment, EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (May 16, 
2006), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_race_color.html [https://perma.cc/QB5T-P5L2]. 
 53 See, e.g., Chaiffetz v. Robertson Research Holding, Ltd., 798 F.2d 731, 733 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(finding Title VII’s prohibition of national origin discrimination applies to all nations, including the 
United States). 
 54 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
 55 “Religious” Nature of a Practice or Belief, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2016). 
 56 Peterson v. Wilmur Commc’ns, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (finding a 
group promulgating white supremacy and denying the Holocaust constituted a protected “religion”). 
 57 Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that under Title VII “‘re-
ligion’ includes antipathy to religion.”). 
 58 See generally Van Koten v. Family Health Mgmt., Inc., 134 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 1998) (treating 
Wicca as protected under “religion”). 
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tion of religion is thus, with few exceptions,59 symmetrical. In much the same 
way, the Equal Pay Act60 protects both men and women,61 and Section 1981, 
which forbids race discrimination in the making of contracts, protects people 
of all races.62 
The most recent statutory instantiation of the symmetry principle is the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).63 This statute makes it 
illegal to discriminate against applicants, employees, and former employees on 
the basis of genetic information.64
 
GINA covers all forms of genetic infor-
mation, and because every individual has a genetic makeup, GINA effectively 
covers everyone.65 
Symmetry is such a strong norm that it sometimes appears unexpectedly. 
For instance, it might seem intuitive that under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA)66 only some people have legally-cognizable disabilities, making 
the statute asymmetrical.67 To be entitled to rights under the ADA, one must 
                                                                                                                           
 59 Generally speaking, “religion” does not protect those with a belief system that is purely per-
sonal, political, social, idiosyncratic, and/or too informal. MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIM-
INATION LAW 256–58 (1988); see Am. Postal Workers Union v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 772, 777 
(9th Cir. 1986) (finding postal worker’s strong opposition to war a religious belief); Wessling v. 
Kroger Co., 554 F. Supp. 548, 552 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (finding participation in preparing for a play in 
a church hall was social and not religious); Brown v. Pena, 441F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 1977) 
(finding that eating cat food was not a religious practice because it was not a belief “based on a theory 
of ‘man’s nature or his place in the Universe’”). 
 60 Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012)). 
 61 Though the Equal Pay Act (EPA) was created to address the lesser bargaining power of female 
employees, the language of the EPA applies equally to men and women. Basic Applicability of the 
Equal Pay Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1620.1(c) (2017). 
 62 42 U.S.C. § 1981; McDonald, 427 U.S. at 286 (rejecting the argument that white citizens are 
not protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1981). 
 63 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.). 
 64 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1. 
 65 Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination Law, 63 ALA. 
L. REV. 955, 986 (2012). 
 66 American with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012 & Supp. 2017)). 
 67 This Article treats the Americans with Disabilities Act as asymmetrical, even though the 2008 
ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) moved the statute closer to protecting all groups. Under the 
Amendments, the statute now explicitly provides that a “regarded as” plaintiff need only prove an 
employer made an adverse employment decision due to the plaintiff’s real or perceived impairment; 
there is now no requirement, as there once was under the ADA, that the employer regard the impair-
ment as sufficiently serious or stigmatizing. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (“An individual meets the 
requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or 
she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived 
physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major 
life activity.”). This change to the “regarded as” prong means that almost anyone who believes they 
have experienced discrimination can bring a discrimination claim under the ADA. See id. Professor 
Michelle Travis has observed that we might now describe the “‘regarded as’ prong as a form of legal 
protection for individuals without disabilities.” Michelle A. Travis, Impairment as Protected Status: A 
New Universality for Disability Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937, 998 (2012). 
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generally be a person with a disability, have a record of a disability, or be re-
garded as having a disability.68 These protections facially apply to only certain 
groups. 
The ADA, however, (like most antidiscrimination statutes) contains 
symmetrical protections for association,69 mistaken perception,70 and retalia-
tion.71 These protections serve all groups. So under the ADA, individuals with-
out disabilities are protected from discrimination due to a mistakenly per-
ceived disability,72 because of their relationship with someone who is disa-
bled,73 or for opposing conduct that violates the statute.74 The ADA also pro-
tects individuals without disabilities through provisions prohibiting or limiting 
the use of medical examinations at certain times in the job application pro-
cess.75 
Even seemingly asymmetrical statutes may belie their core commitment 
to symmetry. For example, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)76 amend-
ed Title VII to redefine the terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” to 
                                                                                                                           
 68 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1). 
 69 E.g., Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892–93 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(holding discrimination because of an interracial marriage or interracial association was, in essence, 
discrimination based on race). 
 70 E.g., Arsham v. Mayor of Balt., 85 F. Supp. 3d 841, 848 (D. Md. 2015) (holding employer’s 
action based on employer’s perception that plaintiff was Indian or Native American, even though he 
was not, served as proper basis for a Title VII claim); Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 
1299–1300 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that “a harasser’s use of epithets associated with a different 
ethnic or racial minority than the plaintiff[’s] will not necessarily shield an employer from liability for 
a hostile work environment” where an African-American employee was referred to as a Native Amer-
ican); EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding a party may claim 
national origin discrimination even if the discrimination does not accurately identify their true national 
origin); Estate of Amos ex rel. Amos v. City of Page, 257 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 2001) (interpret-
ing Section 1983 to allow a claim against a municipality for discrimination based on the mistaken 
assumption that a plaintiff was Native American). 
 71 All antidiscrimination statutes include protections against retaliation for taking steps to enforce 
the statutes. These protections typically include retaliation armor for opposing a practice one believes 
to be unlawful, filing a charge, or participating in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing. E.g., 29 
U.S.C. § 623(d) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a), 12203 (Title VII and ADA, respectively). 
 72 See Travis, supra note 67, at 948–49 (discussing how courts required proof of an employers’ 
mistaken perception under the “regarded as” prong). But see Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gate-
keeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 132–35 (2017) (chronicling how the ADA’s “regarded as” prong has 
been ineffective). 
 73 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2012) (defining discrimination to include “excluding or otherwise 
denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individ-
ual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association”); e.g., Barker v. 
Int’l Paper Co., 993 F. Supp. 10, 15–16 (D. Me. 1998) (holding that nondisabled employee set forth 
an ADA retaliation claim by claiming he was fired for seeking accommodation for his disabled wife). 
 74 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (prohibiting discrimination against anyone who opposes unlawful con-
duct—defined by the ADA—or participates in any ADA “investigation, proceeding, or hearing”). 
 75 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d). 
 76 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). 
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explicitly include pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.77 Under 
the PDA, an employer cannot use pregnancy as a reason to fire a worker, cut 
pay, or deny health benefits. While only one group of workers (women) is pro-
tected under this amendment to Title VII, the PDA exists to ensure women are 
covered equitably under “sex.”78 To the extent that the PDA is merely ensuring 
complete coverage under a category (sex) that is symmetrical, the PDA is fur-
thering symmetry. 
Symmetry is also exemplified in the way the Supreme Court interprets 
and applies the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. State action 
is subject to differing levels of scrutiny (strict, intermediate, or rational basis) 
depending upon the ground, but the level of scrutiny does not change based on 
the particular group implicated.79 For example, there is only one level of scru-
tiny for race. As a result, whether a law directly impacts Native Americans or 
Whites or Blacks, courts scrutinize the action strictly—and they do so whether 
the motivation for the state action is hostile, benign, or neither.80 
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Court reasoned 
that attempting to apply different levels of judicial review to different races 
was a nonstarter.81 In holding that all races must receive the same level of judi-
cial scrutiny, the Court noted that there was no principled basis for deciding 
which groups merited “heightened judicial solicitude.”82 In particular, the 
Court said that trying to evaluate the extent of bias suffered by various groups 
would be an exercise in sociological and political analysis, which falls outside 
the realm of judicial competence.83 The Court asserted that its role is to discern 
principles that are “sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the 
community and continuity over significant periods of time.”84 In much the 
same way, the breadth of the symmetry principle gives social and temporal 
stability to antidiscrimination measures. For example, the universal scope of 
the protectorate under a statute like GINA is not just responsive to the concerns 
of particular places and times, but will have traction and continuity over a pe-
riod of time—and even as there are advances in our knowledge of the human 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Id. 
 78 See Noa Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1203–04 (2016) 
(citing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act as one example of Congress’s attempt to ensure equal op-
portunities for historically disfavored groups, such as women). 
 79 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (applying strict scrutiny to all race- or national origin-
based claims, regardless of which race or national origin is implicated). 
 80 Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381, 397−98 (1989) (observing we 
must approach state action with the same “presumptions, suspicions, and level of scrutiny,” regardless 
of the group advantaged and independent of the reason for the law). 
 81 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294–96 (1978). 
 82 Id. at 296. 
 83 Id. at 297 
 84 Id. at 299 (quoting ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOV-
ERNMENT 114 (1976)). 
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genome. Although some groups may have a greater need for antidiscrimination 
protection than other groups, under a symmetrical approach, all groups are pro-
tected. 
Asymmetry is sometimes still found in U.S. discrimination laws; the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),85 which protects only those over 
the age of forty, is the most paradigmatic case. Under the ADEA, there is an 
asymmetry in coverage between those who are under, and over, the age of for-
ty even though we all have an age. The design of the statute was intended to be 
inclusive toward relatively older groups and exclusive toward relatively 
younger groups. 
The doctrine of affirmative action is also fundamentally asymmetrical. 
Whether voluntarily adopted or court imposed, affirmative action plans are 
directed only at groups that have been previously excluded by a company or 
within an industry.86 The idea is that a company may take “affirmative action” 
pursuant to a plan or program to remedy past exclusion. The steps may be de-
signed as “race, color, sex or ethnic ‘conscious,’” and may include special re-
cruitment programs or preference methods that give certain groups priority in 
hiring.87 Still, affirmative action is—except in the context of government con-
tractors88 or a court order89—a non-mandatory and thus less prominent feature 
of the antidiscrimination landscape. 
The symmetry principle does not rely on a rigid binary distinction be-
tween symmetry and asymmetry; I have defined the two, not all antidiscrimi-
nation measures will slot squarely into one category or the other. The starting 
point for analyzing the remainder of antidiscrimination measures is the recog-
nition that not all grounds are universally held. For example, only some people 
have qualifying military service under the Uniformed Services Employment 
and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA),90 a legally-cognizable disability 
under the ADA, or a medical or familial situation that would precipitate a right 
to leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).91 We might intui-
tively call such statutes asymmetrical, but they are not very exclusive; while 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012 & Supp. 2017)). 
 86 Establishing Affirmative Action Plans, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4(a)–(b) (2017). 
 87 Id. § 1608.4(c). 
 88 General Purpose and Contents of Affirmative Action Programs, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10(c) (2017) 
(requiring contractors to keep and “make available” records of affirmative action compliance). 
 89 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (noting that if a court finds an employer has intentionally discrimi-
nated, the court may “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate”). 
 90 Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 8432b and 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4333 (2012 & 
Supp. 2017)). 
 91 Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 
5 U.S.C. §§ 6381–6387 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611–2619, 2631–2636, 2651–1654 (2012)). 
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not everyone has a right to nondiscrimination on the basis of leave taken or 
military service, not everyone needs these rights. 
In such cases, the exclusionary effect is muted since most non-universal 
grounds may either be chosen or will be held eventually. For example, many 
people have the capacity to choose military service or to adopt or foster a 
child, and take leave from work. Were someone to make those choices, they 
would be protected from discrimination under USERRA or FMLA, respective-
ly. Alternatively, we will all be protected on the basis of age (under the ADEA) 
if we live to the age of forty, and on the basis of disability (under the ADA), if 
we live long enough.92 This dampens any exclusion under these regimes since 
it means that very few are born into a world where they are necessarily exclud-
ed from the protective contour of these statutes. The parsing out of the defini-
tion of the symmetry principle, and its pervasiveness throughout the corpus of 
discrimination law, indicates how antidiscrimination laws are fundamentally 
inclusive—even in cases where they are not purely symmetrical. 
At its base, the symmetry principle is a code of inclusion. Once a state or 
federal legislature has settled on a trait or characteristic that should be off lim-
its for certain types of distributional decisions (in domains such as housing, 
employment, or education) the symmetry principle means that all are included, 
and none are excluded, in the extension of that protection.93 Of course, in prac-
tice, some groups will partake more than others in certain types of protections. 
But when it comes to the opportunistic structure of antidiscrimination law, the 
symmetry principle means that all are protected under the law in the pursuit of 
certain types of opportunities. 
C. Symmetry as Unique Design Compromise 
Symmetry may be seen as a design compromise between group-
consciousness and universalism in fashioning laws to prevent and rectify sub-
ordination. On one end of the spectrum are group-conscious or targeted ap-
proaches which are typically focused on challenging the oppression of histori-
cally oppressed groups.94 Group-conscious approaches embrace both grounds 
                                                                                                                           
 92 Nearly everyone will eventually be disabled since the prevalence of impairments increase as 
one ages. Bradley A. Areheart, GINA, Privacy, and Antisubordination, 46 GA. L. REV. 705, 716 
(2012). Consider that 13% of people ages twenty-one to sixty-four have a disability, but 53% of per-
sons over age seventy-five have a disability. PAUL T. JAEGER, DISABILITY AND THE INTERNET: CON-
FRONTING A DIGITAL DIVIDE 18 (Ronald J. Berger ed., 2012). 
 93 While this may sound reminiscent of the anticlassification principle, symmetry is different as is 
explained in Part I.C. See infra notes 94–121 and accompanying text. 
 94 Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitu-
tional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 (2004). Cass Sunstein has similarly 
argued against certain types of stereotyping by observing that “the most elementary antidiscrimination 
principle singles out one kind of economically rational stereotyping and condemns it, on the theory 
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and groups, but dispense with formal equality on the theory that disadvantaged 
classes are not similarly situated to privileged classes.95 In practice, this may 
mean that a particular group should be treated more favorably than a more 
privileged class to remedy a lack of opportunities.96 Targeted approaches en-
courages policy-makers to address the structural effects of discrimination by 
implementing certain asymmetrical practices, such as affirmative action or 
reparations, which stand to effect the distribution of resources.97 Group-
conscious approaches have the virtue of efficiently and transparently attempt-
ing to aid or shelter certain groups, who are often the people who need it most. 
On the other end of the spectrum are universalist approaches, which ig-
nore both groups and grounds, and instead guarantee certain rights or benefits 
to “a broad group of people not defined according to the identity axes . . . high-
lighted by our antidiscrimination laws.”98 Over the last twenty years, numerous 
esteemed scholars have advocated for universal workplace protections to ad-
dress certain beleaguering issues of discrimination. For instance, scholars have 
sought expansion of sexual harassment jurisprudence to cover all forms of har-
assment.99 Theorists have also proposed expanding leave policies to extend 
beyond family responsibilities.100 Even more broadly, some scholars have ar-
                                                                                                                           
that such stereotyping has the harmful long-term consequence of perpetuating group-based inequali-
ties.” Sunstein, supra note 12, at 2418. 
 95 Areheart, supra note 65, at 963–64. 
 96 Id. at 964. 
 97 See Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence 
for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1398–99 (1991) (noting strategies such as affirma-
tive action, reparations, and restrictions of hate speech all “recognize that ours is a non-neutral world 
in which legal attention to past and present injustice requires rules that work against the flood of struc-
tural subordination”). 
 98 Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 2842. 
 99 See, e.g., Brady Coleman, Shame, Rage and Freedom of Speech: Should the United States 
Adopt European “Mobbing” Laws?, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 53, 62–63 (2006); William R. Cor-
bett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 91, 96 (2003); 
Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace 
Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1, 3–6 (1999); Catherine L. Fisk, Humiliation at Work, 8 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 73, 75 (2001); Susan Harthill, The Need for a Revitalized Regulatory Scheme to Address 
Workplace Bullying in the United States: Harnessing the Federal Occupational Safety and Health 
Act, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1250, 1253 (2010); David C. Yamada, Workplace Bullying and American 
Employment Law: A Ten-Year Progress Report and Assessment, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 251, 
253 (2010). 
 100 See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Policy Challenges and Opportunities for Workplace Flexibility: 
The State of Play, in WORK-LIFE POLICIES 251, 270 (Ann C. Crouter & Alan Booth eds., 2009); Ra-
chel Arnow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between Public Law and Voluntary 
Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081, 1108–12 (2010); Mary Anne Case, 
How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and How the Burden of 
Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753, 1765–66 (2001); Katherine M. 
Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 181–87 
(2001); Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 834, 835 (2002); Vicki Schultz, 
Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1882–86 (2000). 
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gued that vulnerability is a universal part of the human experience and the state 
should develop structures to address the disadvantage that accompanies vul-
nerability.101 
Universalist solutions to discrimination have several advantages. They 
may avoid political backlashes and help ensure broad judicial implementa-
tion.102 They may also help avert what Professor Kenji Yoshino has termed 
“pluralism anxiety,” in which people are anxious about our increasing demo-
graphic diversity.103 Yoshino notes that speaking of rights in a “universal regis-
ter” can help prevent our further breaking up into “fiefs” that do not communi-
cate.104 
Symmetry offers a compromise between antidiscrimination policies that 
are narrowly tailored to a specific group (e.g., protecting only African Ameri-
cans or women) and those that create generic rights (e.g., requiring termination 
be for “just cause”). The benefits of this compromise will be explored further 
in Part II, but it is worth preliminarily sketching them here. 
On the one hand, the symmetry principle retains the moorings of identity 
just like targeted approaches. This affirms the social salience of identity and 
allows for some tailoring, which can, for tactical reasons, make such laws 
more effective.105 Symmetry also avoids creating generic or universal rights 
that either do not align well with the harms suffered by specific groups or re-
quire assimilation into existing forms of privilege.106 Symmetry, like group-
consciousness and unlike universalism, also facilitates the invocation of rights. 
Such invocations are powerful: they raise people’s consciousness regarding 
particular social issues,107 they change what employers feel they must provide 
and what employees feel they deserve from employers,108 and they change 
how corporate counsel advise clients to avoid liability.109 
On the other hand, symmetry harnesses many of the benefits of universal 
approaches. Symmetry is broad enough to foster a sense of solidarity, not back-
                                                                                                                           
 101 Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condi-
tion, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1, 19–22 (2008). See generally Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerabil-
ity, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513 (2008) (applying Fineman’s theory to 
disability). 
 102 Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 2847–50. 
 103 Yoshino, supra note 26, at 751. 
 104 See id. at 747, 792–93. 
 105 See, e.g., infra notes 181–200 and accompanying text (referring to Part II.B.2, “Goodwill and 
Dilution,” which details how more targeted antidiscrimination initiatives may avoid diluting the 
goodwill available for such measures). 
 106 See infra notes 151–154 and accompanying text. 
 107 Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers 
Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 114 (2003). 
 108 Id. at 121. 
 109 Id. 
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lash, when it comes to fighting certain types of bias.110 Symmetry, like univer-
salism, emphasizes people’s commonalities rather than their differences.111 
Symmetry also aids with matters of proof, where narrowly tailored measures 
often result in a heavy dose of protected class gatekeeping.112 Further, sym-
metry avoids the negative distributive effects (namely hurting labor market 
participation) that sometimes accrue to group-conscious approaches.113 Finally, 
symmetrical protections allow a more complete challenge to stereotypes, 
where more targeted protections may not.114 
As noted in the Introduction, the symmetry principle is not coextensive 
with existing theories, though it overlaps in times and places with anticlassifi-
cation.115 Still, the vision of symmetry is altogether unique. Under the anticlas-
sification principle, institutions ought to make decisions without regard to cer-
tain characteristics, much like when orchestras hold auditions with the musi-
cian separated by a screen to ensure the performance is only evaluated based 
on musical merit.116 The anticlassification model is intended to “blind” our 
ability, over time, to meaningfully distinguish certain traits by prohibiting the 
very consideration of those traits—ideally resulting in a culture that is, for ex-
ample, colorblind, sex-blind, or genome-blind.117 
Symmetry has a different theoretical aim than anticlassification because it 
does not aspire to blindness. For example, Title VII protects sex symmetrically 
and robustly. The evolved vision of Title VII is not that we should ignore sex 
and its gendered performativity, but instead that we should be suspicious of all 
gendered practices. In other words, we should spotlight sex and gender in or-
der to treat concomitant stereotypes with skepticism.118 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See infra notes 163–180, 201–213 and accompanying text (referring to “Interest Convergence” 
and “Backlash”). 
 111 See infra notes 133–140 and accompanying text (referring to “Commonality and Solidarity”). 
 112 See generally Clarke, supra note 72 (discussing how protected class gatekeeping undermines 
the goals of antidiscrimination laws). 
 113 See infra notes 256–268 and accompanying text (referring to “Distributive Effects”). 
 114 See infra notes 237–255 and accompanying text (referring to “Challenging Stereotypes”). 
 115 Various scholars have used antidiscrimination to mean anticlassification. See, e.g., Brest, su-
pra note 30, at 1; Fiss, supra note 24, at 108. I, however, have used the word “antidiscrimination” as a 
holistic term that refers to the general purposes underlying antidiscrimination law. See Jack M. Balkin 
& Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (“In hindsight, [Fiss’s] . . . choice of words was quite unfortunate, 
because there is no particular reason to think that antidiscrimination law or the principle of antidis-
crimination is primarily concerned with classification or differentiation as opposed to subordination 
and the denial of equal citizenship. Both antisubordination and anticlassification might be understood 
as possible ways of fleshing out the meaning of the antidiscrimination principle, and thus as candi-
dates for the ‘true’ principle underlying antidiscrimination law.”). 
 116 Clarke, supra note 72, at 143 (citing Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impar-
tiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 716 (2000)). 
 117 Areheart, supra note 65, at 963. 
 118 I thank Jessica Clarke for raising this point. 
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Symmetry also diverges doctrinally in that some antidiscrimination ap-
proaches require us to consider and classify on the basis of traits (an affront to 
anticlassification), but the protections they extend apply to all groups (and are 
thus symmetrical). For example, Title VII contains a cause of action for dispar-
ate impact, which provides recourse when a facially neutral standard or prac-
tice has a disproportionate impact on one group when it comes to hiring, firing, 
or promotion. Disparate impact requires people to be classified into racial 
groups, with liability hinging on how the statuses of those groups compare; 
such classification is a clear affront to the anticlassification principle.119 Dis-
parate impact, however, also protects all groups, making the protection plainly 
symmetrical.120 
Similarly, Title VII’s solution to the problem of religious discrimination is 
not simply to force employers to ignore religious beliefs. Instead, the statute 
goes beyond the anticlassification principle to require employers be religion-
conscious at times by accommodating religious practices. At the same time, be-
cause “religion” has been defined so broadly, encompassing atheists and white 
supremacists and nearly everyone, the right to religious accommodations is in 
harmony with the symmetry principle.121 Symmetry does not prescribe the form 
of protection (and in particular, whether it “classifies” or not), making it a prin-
ciple that wholly encompasses, and is more fulsome than, anticlassification. 
II. THE CASE FOR SYMMETRY 
This Part makes the case for symmetry as a customary feature of the anti-
discrimination landscape. Symmetry combines many of the strengths of anti-
                                                                                                                           
 119 Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
493, 508 (2003) (“If the substance of an express racial classification is an express command that peo-
ple be classified by race, then Title VII’s disparate impact provision surely qualifies.”). 
 120 E.g., Meditz v. City of Newark, 658 F.3d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 2011) (allowing white plaintiff to 
challenge city residency requirement that had disparate impact on non-Hispanic white applicants); 
Craig v. Ala. State Univ., 804 F.2d 682, 688 (11th Cir. 1986) (upholding disparate impact claim by 
white applicant where historically black university staff was already mostly black due to hiring prefer-
ence program); Ferrell v. Johnson, No. 4:09-CV-40, 2011 WL 1225907, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 30, 
2011) (rejecting defendant’s argument that white plaintiff could not advance a disparate impact claim 
under Title VII); Johnson v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., Nos. 3:07-0979, 3:08-0031, 
2008 WL 3163531, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2008) (noting white male plaintiffs “convincingly ar-
gue[d]” disparate impact claim); Hannon v. Chater, 887 F. Supp. 1303, 1316–18 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
(evaluating, and not dismissing out of hand, disparate impact claim by white male plaintiff); see also 
e. christi cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I: The Myth of the Protected Class in Title VII 
Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REV. 441, 448–49 (1998) (observing disparate impact pro-
tects white male employees). But see Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250, 1252–53 
(10th Cir. 1986) (rejecting a claim that a maximum height restriction had a disparate impact on men 
while observing men were not a “historically disfavored group”). 
 121 Supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text. 
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classification, antisubordination, antibalkanization, and universalism.122 Pro-
fessor Sam Bagenstos has recently outlined a model set of concerns (Expres-
sive, Tactical, and Substantive) that might be analyzed in considering how best 
to address discriminatory harms.123 This Part evaluates the arguments for and 
against symmetry under the same headings. Expressive concerns are examined 
through the messages a symmetrical law sends to the public. Tactical concerns 
address symmetry’s role in currying political goodwill and avoiding political 
backlash. Substantive concerns explore how the symmetrical design of the pro-
tectorate may be an effective policy tool for addressing injustice. Though ad-
dressed separately, there is no impermeable boundary between these categories 
of analysis.124 
The strengths and weaknesses outlined in this Part are theoretical.125 Any 
particular policy must be analyzed in context to determine whether it will yield 
certain advantages or disadvantages.126 Accordingly, it is impossible to con-
clude in the abstract that symmetrical protections are better than asymmetrical 
ones, or vice versa. An asymmetrical policy may make more sense if the harms 
are one-sided (as they often are in the case of disability or race), and the polity 
is willing to accept the risks of essentialism.127 Accordingly, the strengths and 
weaknesses outlined below are presumptive but may be rebutted by a contex-
tual examination of specific initiatives. 
A. Expressively 
Symmetry has several expressive advantages. By expressive, I am refer-
ring to the fact that laws do more than secure material rights and deter certain 
behaviors.128 Rather, they reflect social values and send messages to the public 
about both what society should value and how the relevant subject should be 
valued.129 Laws are constitutive of who we are,130 as well as pervasively ex-
                                                                                                                           
 122 For example, symmetry captures some of the advantages of universalism, such as avoiding 
dangerous political dynamics and protecting a broad swath of citizens. But unlike universalist solu-
tions, it avoids the dilution of rights through keeping grounds salient. 
 123 See generally Bagenstos, supra note 26 (evaluating the arguments for and against universalism 
by examining Tactics, Substance, and Expressivism). 
 124 For example, an expressive dimension of symmetry may well influence a tactical dynamic, 
which in turn helps or hurts the substantive effectiveness of the law. 
 125 Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 
IND. L.J. 1219, 1240 (2011) (making a similar observation about universalism). 
 126 Id. 
 127 See infra notes 273–309 and accompanying text (referencing Part III which further explains 
where asymmetrical protections are sensible). 
 128 See generally RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND 
LIMITS (2015) (discussing the law’s capacity to do more than punish, legitimize, or deter). 
 129 See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504–06 (2000); Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change 
Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 43 (2002); Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago 
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pressive.131 While determining the expressive meaning of a particular measure 
is unavoidably complex,132 it is worthwhile to consider the expressive potential 
of antidiscrimination measures, especially since such expressions may impact 
social norms and overall support for the law. 
1. Commonality and Solidarity 
One expressive benefit of symmetry in law is its emphasis on people’s 
commonalities rather than their differences.133 Naturally, this can help build 
solidarity on particular issues.134 For example, a contributing factor in building 
support in the U.S. around the immorality of race discrimination in the 1960s 
was the sense that all race discrimination—whether it was against blacks, 
whites, or Hispanics—was wrong. Symmetry as a principle of antidiscrimina-
tion signals that we are not fundamentally different. Instead, we all have com-
plex identities and certain features of those identities (such as race or sex or 
genetic coding) are always protected from discrimination. 
Here, we might consider Professor Reva Siegel’s work on antibalkaniza-
tion, an approach under which legal interventions should be designed to pro-
mote solidarity and social cohesion.135 Even though antibalkanization may 
sometimes support race-conscious asymmetry, Siegel argues such interventions 
are only justified when they are formulated to affirm commonality and mini-
mize the appearance of partiality.136 When protections are targeted toward one 
specific group, they may send the message “that we should think of ourselves 
as defined by our membership in particular, socially salient groups.”137 
Another scholar has argued for broader protection from harassment.138 
When the law focuses on sexual harassment as women’s problem it misses the 
fact that “workplace harassment, sexualized or nonsexualized, injures the dig-
                                                                                                                           
School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662–72 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of 
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024–25 (1996) (exploring “the function of law in ‘making state-
ments’ as opposed to controlling behavior directly”). 
 130 Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 109–13 (1984) (writing on 
“[l]aw as [c]onstitutive of [c]onsciousness”). 
 131 Anderson & Pildes, supra note 129, at 1504; Geisinger, supra note 129, at 40–41. 
 132 Anderson & Pildes, supra note 129, at 1504 (acknowledging the complexity of determining 
“expressive meaning”). 
 133 E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part) (“To pursue the concept of racial entitlement—even for the most admirable and benign of pur-
poses—is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, 
race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American.”). 
 134 Advocates of universalist measures have made a similar argument in favor of such approaches. 
Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 2864. 
 135 Siegel, supra note 25, at 1280–86. 
 136 Id. at 1302, 1354, 1358–59. 
 137 Bagenstos, supra note 26, at 2864. 
 138 Ehrenreich, supra note 99, at 4. 
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nitary interests of individual harassment victims, regardless of their sex and 
regardless of the sex of their harassers.”139 Therefore, harassing female em-
ployees is unethical not due to their sex, but their status as humans.140 
The symmetry principle is a consistent signal that antidiscrimination pro-
tections advance the human cause—but without the drawbacks, which will be 
explained below, of a universal frame. Symmetry affirms the dignitary interests 
of all groups without the need to say whose rights are more important. Finally, 
symmetry encourages people to think of themselves as part of a broad group 
with a shared and noncompetitive interest in nondiscrimination. 
2. Ground Salience and Rights Talk 
A second expressive benefit of symmetry is that it retains the moorings of 
antidiscrimination categories, such as disability, race, sex, and age. There is a 
trend to dispense with such grounds and create “generic rights.”141 Scholars 
have advanced universalist approaches to Equal Protection,142 voting,143 work-
place accommodations,144 and employment discrimination.145 But grounds or 
classes of identity serve important social functions, including “rights talk,” the 
discourse that determines how society understands civil rights.146 Claiming 
rights can inspire structural changes “in complex and iterative ways” beyond 
the courtroom.147 
There are at least two risks to identity-neutral, or “generic,” rights. First, 
generic rights may not redress—or may actually worsen—the specific harms 
                                                                                                                           
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Clarke, supra note 125, at 1220, 1245–46. 
 142 See Yoshino, supra note 26, at 748–49 (arguing for a shift from group-based equality claims 
to universal liberty-based claims). 
 143 Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 100, 
119 (2013) (proposing “smart disclosure” regime that would apply to all voting changes); Richard H. 
Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights Policy: From Anti-Discrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 HOW. 
L.J. 741, 743–44 (2006) (defending a universalist approach to voting rights). 
 144 Michael Ashley Stein, Anita Silvers, Bradley A. Areheart & Leslie Pickering Francis, Accom-
modating Every Body, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 693 (2014) (arguing for an ADA-type reasonable ac-
commodation mandate to apply to all work-capable members of the general population for whom 
accommodation is necessary to enable their ability to work); see SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND 
THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 53–54 (2009); Arnow-Richman, 
supra note 100, at 1108–12. 
 145 Eyer, supra note 26, at 1341 (arguing for “extra-discrimination remedies” to address discrimi-
natory conduct in the workplace). 
 146 I borrow the term “rights talk” here from Mary Ann Glendon. See generally MARY ANN 
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991) (stressing the 
importance of “overcoming our disdain for politics,” accepting responsibility for social progress, and 
embracing an inclusive approach to the ongoing discourse of civil rights in the United States). 
 147 Williams & Segal, supra note 107, at 121; see Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Recon-
structing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C. L. L. REV. 401, 405–06 (1987) (de-
fending the language of rights for people of color as empowering and useful). 
2017] The Symmetry Principle 1107 
suffered by certain groups. For instance, a universal right to workplace leave 
may be politically palatable and help normalize leave. It may actually widen 
the gender gap, however, if men and women make different uses of such leave. 
Some scholars have long observed that women often use workplace leave to 
take care of family, while men often use the time to make themselves better 
workers.148 
Similarly, providing universal redress for harassment or bullying may not 
accurately address the harms suffered by women. While women are often seen 
as prototypical victims of sexual harassment, employers and courts may apply 
different standards for men and women when it comes to what constitutes 
“general” bullying. For example, social scientists and legal scholars have long 
contended that aggression in the workplace is a virtue for men and a liability 
for women.149 If aggression is normative for men, people may apply a lower 
threshold when it comes to what constitutes bullying or harassment by women. 
Accordingly, generic anti-bullying rules may not only fail to help women but 
may instead cast them unexpectedly into the position of bully.150 
Second, generic rights may undermine the goal of equality by requiring 
assimilation into “the mold of the privileged group.”151 For example, under the 
Texas Ten Percent Plan, which guarantees seniors in the top ten percent of their 
high school classes admission to any public university in Texas,152 class rank is 
a facially neutral standard. The underlying economic and cultural differences 
that help shape one’s educational opportunities prior to high school, however, 
are not neutral.153 In other words, the opportunity under a policy like this re-
quires assimilation into the mold of what privileged groups are doing to help 
                                                                                                                           
 148 Clarke, supra note 125, at 1275–77; Joan C. Williams, Reconstructive Feminism: Changing 
the Way We Talk About Gender and Work Thirty Years After the PDA, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM, 79, 
89 (2009). 
 149 See JOYCE K. FLETCHER, DISAPPEARING ACTS: GENDER, POWER, AND RELATIONAL PRAC-
TICE AT WORK 107–112 (2001); JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER 236–44 (1995); Alice H. 
Eagly et al., Gender and the Evaluation of Leaders: A Meta-Analysis, 111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 18 
(1992) (concluding women tend to be devalued in leadership capacities when those duties are carried 
out in ways that are stereotypically masculine). 
 150 Professor Jessica Clarke notes there is already a tendency in the media to paint women as 
prototypical workplace bullies. Clarke, supra note 125, at 1253–54. 
 151 Id. at 1246. 
 152 Danielle Holley & Delia Spencer, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 34 HARV. C.R.-C. L. L. REV. 
245, 253–62 (1999). 
 153 While it might be tempting to view class rank as the natural outcome of inherent academic 
talent, all behavioral outcomes are a delicate and multi-faceted composition. See FISHKIN, supra note 
30, at 94–104. According to Fishkin, any physiological aptitude must be activated by a person’s envi-
ronment, which encompasses everything from parents to one’s economic class to one’s interactions 
with a social world not blind to difference. Id. at 94–95. So when we question how it is that someone 
has achieved the status of, for example, “top ten percent,” the answer is that there has been “a multi-
staged, ‘iterative process of interaction between a person and her environment.’” Id. at 104. 
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their children advance educationally. Even if the legal rule is blind to differ-
ence, the economy of opportunities is not.154 
Symmetry offers a compromise between antidiscrimination policies that 
are narrowly tailored to a specific group and those that would abandon the 
moorings of identity by creating generic rights. On the one hand, the symmetry 
principle makes grounds less prominent than group-conscious approaches, by 
encompassing all groups. On the other hand, symmetry retains the protected 
class moorings of identity, unlike universal approaches. Group-conscious ap-
proaches evoke Chief Justice Harry Blackmun’s view that “[i]n order to get 
beyond racism, we must first take account of race . . . . [I]n order to treat some 
persons equally, we must treat them differently.”155 Universal approaches 
summon to mind Chief Justice Roberts statement that “[t]he way to stop dis-
crimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of 
race.”156 In this context, symmetry strikes a balance between making race too 
salient and not salient enough. It calls neither for people to ignore race, nor for 
differential treatment. Symmetry might thus be seen as a middle ground to ap-
proaching the social salience of grounds. 
Symmetry also facilitates the discourse of rights, where universal ap-
proaches do not. If the goal of discrimination law is social change on behalf of 
subordinated groups, we must not overlook opportunities to effect “norm cas-
cades” through the language of rights.157 Universal approaches simply do not—
beyond the most general appeals—provide the same opportunities for rights talk. 
3. Objections 
One objection to the expressive strengths outlined above is that symmetry 
may attenuate the message. Many times, we are not attempting to say that a 
particular type of discrimination is wrong; rather, that a particular group has 
been subordinated and that the law ought to do something about the subordina-
tion. For example, when the Supreme Court was asked in General Dynamics 
Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline to consider whether the ADEA covered younger 
workers, or only those over forty, the Court did not spend any time assessing 
the unitary wrongness of age discrimination.158 Age discrimination was wrong, 
                                                                                                                           
 154 Clarke, supra note 125, at 1246. 
 155 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 156 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality 
opinion). 
 157 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996) 
(arguing social norms are “fragile” and that successful norm change can lead to “norm cascades,” 
which involve rapid shifts in social mores). 
 158 Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 594–96 (2004). 
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according to the Court, when it had a tendency to subordinate workers.159 In 
that light, the evidence clearly counseled in favor of protection for older—but 
not younger—workers. Because there is sometimes a zero-sum relationship 
between protecting younger and older workers, respectively, one might read 
Cline as focused on the greater disadvantage faced by older workers. Extrapo-
lating from Cline, one might view antisubordination as a trump card, which—
where there is a zero-sum relationship—may favor asymmetrical protections 
designed to cover only specific groups who have suffered past discrimination. 
One might counter, however, that group-specific signaling is near-sighted. 
For instance, in the case of age, there is a growing literature that chronicles 
how millennials are suffering from unwarranted stereotypes and frequently 
experiencing discrimination.160 Commentators have recently uncovered dis-
crimination against those under the age of forty in the technology sector161 and 
television broadcasting.162 If the ADEA was crafted to cover age generally—
instead of only workers over the age of 40—the statute would have had greater 
adaptive promise for addressing emerging forms of age bias. 
B. Tactically 
The tactical realm addresses symmetry’s role in currying political good-
will and avoiding social and judicial backlash. Tactical support is critical at 
two different phases: passage and implementation. While a law must have 
strong political support in order to be enacted, it must also avoid strong levels 
of backlash for its message to be accepted and integrated into society. Given 
that implementation of discrimination law depends on judges and voluntary 
compliance by individuals, we must consider the matter of support across po-
litical, judicial, and social realms. This section first considers symmetry as a 
form of interest convergence by design. Symmetry also plays a centrist role in 
                                                                                                                           
 159 In Cline, Justice Souter stated that though the ADEA’s protection of only those over the age of 
forty may initially seem “odd,” it is in fact based on reason. Id. at 605. “Congress could easily con-
clude” that younger workers are highly likely to find employment elsewhere after being dismissed for 
“irrational age discrimination,” whereas older workers would likely encounter more difficulties recov-
ering from such a dismissal. See id. 
 160 See, e.g., JESSICA KRIEGEL, UNFAIRLY LABELED: HOW YOUR WORKPLACE CAN BENEFIT 
FROM DITCHING GENERATIONAL STEREOTYPES 54–60, 75–86, 99–102 (2016) (chronicling the dis-
crimination faced by “millennials”); Ellen Powell, Study: Millennials Really Are Making Less Than 
Their Parents Did, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/
2017/0113/Study-Millennials-really-are-making-less-than-their-parents-did [https://perma.cc/G9R4-
UMYS]. 
 161 See generally DAN LYONS, DISRUPTED: MY MISADVENTURE IN THE START-UP BUBBLE 
(2016) (writing about age discrimination at start-ups and noting that age discrimination affects even 
younger employees within the technology sector). 
 162 E.g., Kirsten Acuna, Age Discrimination on TV: 10 Anchors Who Were Replaced by Younger 
Women, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/age-discrimination-on-tv-10-
anchors-who-were-replaced-by-younger-women-2012-8 [https://perma.cc/DAY9-VAC5]. 
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managing the limited amount of goodwill that exists for antidiscrimination 
causes and avoiding social backlash. 
1. Interest Convergence 
One starting point for understanding the political appeal of symmetry is 
Derrick Bell’s well-known interest convergence theory. As Bell explained, in the 
context of racial equality, the interests of a subordinated minority are likely to be 
advanced only when they converge with the interests of a dominant majority.163 
Securing legal remedies for minority groups may thus depend upon judges and 
policymakers reaching the conclusion that such remedies “will secure, advance, 
or at least not harm” majority group interests.164 Since first articulating interest-
convergence in 1980, Bell’s theory has been wielded robustly to defend disabil-
ity accommodations,165 explain the circumstances under which institutions pur-
sue racial diversity,166 and defend the earned income tax credit.167 
For example, the “diversity rationale,” which emerged from Grutter v. 
Bollinger168 as the primary justification for affirmative action, has been gener-
ally accepted as a form of interest convergence.169 Professor Nancy Leong has 
argued that this constitutes a type of “racial capitalism” in which whites derive 
social and economic value from non-white racial identity.170 While Leong la-
ments this phenomenon, it has admittedly aided in the implementation of af-
firmative action.171 
We might think of symmetry as interest convergence by design. In particu-
lar, symmetry aligns the interests of majority and minority groups in the follow-
                                                                                                                           
 163 Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Reliving and Learning from Our Racial History, 
66 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 22 (2004) (arguing that “the interest of blacks in achieving racial equality is 
accommodated only when that interest converges with the interests of whites in policy-making posi-
tions”); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980) (explaining Brown required policy makers to recognize 
“the economic and political advances” from desegregation) [hereinafter Bell, Comment]. 
 164 Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with Disabilities 
Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 312 (2009) (quoting Bell, Com-
ment, supra note 163, at 523). 
 165 See id. at 332 (arguing the ADA benefits the nondisabled workforce in effective and meaning-
ful ways). 
 166 Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2171–72 (2013) (arguing diversity 
has historically been sanctioned when whites decide they can derive social or economic value from 
nonwhiteness). 
 167 See Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 798–
99 (2007) (arguing tax policies that penalize low-income taxpayers will hurt white taxpayers more 
than black taxpayers). 
 168 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322–25 (2003). 
 169 See Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1624 (2003) (arguing 
“Grutter and Gratz provide a definitive example of my Interest-Convergence theory”). 
 170 Leong, supra note 166, at 2153. 
 171 Id. at 2155. 
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ing way: If all groups are protected under a relevant ground, then all groups (in-
cluding the majority group) have a stake in both the passage and implementation 
of that protection.172 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a prime example.173 Bell 
observes that the elites of that generation recognized the legislation had wide-
spread popular support,174 which—along with a combination of social, political, 
and economic forces—helped ensure its passage.175 Some have similarly argued 
that people may be more willing to support universal measures, such as welfare, 
precisely because they avoid a zero-sum mentality.176 
On the other hand, we might cynically wonder whether symmetry fosters 
legitimacy by appeal to the dominant group.177 In other words, perhaps sym-
metry, in the tactical context, is just about appeasing those with power.178 
While this objection has merit, antidiscrimination laws cannot succeed without 
social buy-in and support. Even once such laws have passed, judges and insti-
tutions (composed of individual people making individual decisions) must im-
plement them. Such support is necessary in order for society to accept the 
wholesale changes that these laws often imply. Antidiscrimination law is thus 
premised upon social norm change and voluntary compliance.179 This observa-
tion is true of all laws, but especially true for antidiscrimination laws, which 
are notoriously difficult to sue under and win.180 
2. Goodwill and Dilution 
A second way of analyzing symmetry in the tactical realm is to consider 
the need to manage the finite amount of support that exists for antidiscrimina-
tion causes. If such goodwill is limited, then the expansion of discrimination 
laws risks “trivializing the more serious harms of discrimination and under-
                                                                                                                           
 172 See Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 75, 116–17 (arguing that symmetrical antidiscrimination 
statutes tend to be more widely endorsed than racial minority-specific statutes because those in advan-
taged majority groups realize they will benefit from symmetrical protection against discrimination). 
 173 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 1053, 1057 (2005). 
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 178 E.g., Flagg & Goldwasser, supra note 14, at 111 (asserting that symmetry appeals to advan-
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 179 See Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and to 
Legal Authorities, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 983, 984 (2000) (emphasizing the importance of “voluntary 
compliance with the law” to legitimize “legal authorities” in a democracy). 
 180 E.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs 
Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429 (2004); Michael Selmi, Why Are Em-
ployment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 557–58 (2001). 
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mining support for antidiscrimination in general.”181 This has led some con-
temporary theorists to argue against the turn toward universal protections of 
civil rights.182 
Professor Richard Ford has written incisively on this subject.183 He notes 
there are limits to how much support individuals will give to civil rights caus-
es, with both economic and non-economic rationales. On the economic side, 
Ford observes that many antidiscrimination measures impose real costs, 
whether it is access for people with disabilities or limits on a business’s ability 
to maintain uniform standards of grooming.184 There are also non-economic 
limits to goodwill: “The good-natured humanitarian who listens attentively to 
the first claim of social injustice will become an impatient curmudgeon after 
multiple similar admonishments.”185 More practically, busy executives will sit 
through only so many sensitivity training sessions.186 Ford concludes that “if 
goodwill is exhausted and popular opinion sours, the coercive force of law will 
be of little effect.”187 
Professor Kenji Yoshino has similarly echoed the “limited goodwill” senti-
ment through his notion of “pluralism anxiety,” in which he argues people of all 
stripes are anxious about the idea of ever-increasing and ever-more-complicated 
diversity.188 He writes that in the past few decades there has been a proliferation 
of groups clamoring for increased rights.189 As this has occurred, commentators 
on both the left and right have expressed anxiety that we are fracturing into 
groups too polarized to communicate well.190 Dilution of rights may thus occur 
in legislatures, where representatives might be less willing to push for broad an-
tidiscrimination laws, or in the judiciary where judges look for ways to cull their 
caseloads.191 Yoshino finds pluralism anxiety and dilution present at the highest 
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judicial level; he observes that the Supreme Court of the United States has, over 
the past few decades, “systematically denied constitutional protection to new 
groups, curtailed it for already covered groups, and limited Congress’s capacity 
to protect groups through civil rights legislation.”192 
Professor Jessica Clarke further concretizes the goodwill and dilution ar-
guments by examining proposals to expand sexual harassment law and leave 
policy.193 She argues that universal workplace bullying laws may trivialize 
sexual harassment by pooling those who experience sexual coercion with those 
who would base a case on behavior that is merely adolescent and boorish.194 
Clarke also addresses efforts to expand work-family policies to work-life poli-
cies. She argues that expanding leave may undermine employer support for such 
policies.195 In particular, if any employee may request leave for any reason and 
employers cannot inquire into the reasons for the leave sought, the easiest way 
for employers to treat everyone equally may be to stop offering leave.196 
To bring the role of symmetry into focus amidst these critiques of univer-
salism, symmetry may be seen as a targeted means of maintaining goodwill 
while still providing vigorous redress for discrimination. On one hand, the fact 
that all groups are protected may facilitate more goodwill, than under an 
asymmetric measure, through a sense that the law is fair and even-handed.197 
On the other hand, symmetry stops well short of being a universal solution, 
which may push common understandings of civil rights beyond most people’s 
limits.198 Scholars have argued that universal measures may lead to a type of 
compassion or equality fatigue and thus “be unable to overcome political and 
judicial resistance to regulating business and state and local governments.”199 
Universalist approaches are “complicated” and will not necessarily preserve 
the goodwill needed for effective discrimination laws.200 Accordingly, sym-
metry may be understood as superior to both targeted approaches and universal 
ones when it comes to maintaining a social appetite for discrimination laws. 
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3. Backlash 
A third way of considering symmetry’s tactical role is through attention to 
backlash. When antidiscrimination schemes treat people differently, they often 
resist or label the differential treatment as “special treatment.”201 Discrimina-
tion laws that are targeted toward certain groups may be seen as “vexa-
tious.”202 In this light, new rights claims may not merely be dilutive, but also 
engender regressive conflict.203 Universal solutions have been thought to avoid 
backlash on the theory that the measure will be less polarizing and stigmatiz-
ing to the recipients.204 
The potential for backlash is significant because such a response may im-
pair enforcement. Professor Catherine Fisk has argued that if people have the 
impression that certain discrimination laws aid only some people, it may fuel a 
backlash that undermines all antidiscrimination law.205 Other scholars have 
articulated the “fairness” objection in this way: Because the rule of law carries 
“a special demand for evenhandedness,” a law that “‘knows the person’ is not 
law at all, or at least not deserving of respect.”206 Furthering the point, studies 
have shown that the ability to secure voluntary compliance with law is linked 
to the attitudes of a population.207 Accordingly, we must care about backlash to 
the extent it underlies a conviction that certain laws are not legitimate.208 
Symmetry has some degree of a built-in defense against backlash and 
claims about special treatment since a symmetrical discrimination law protects 
all groups from discrimination on the basis of a particular trait. One benefit is 
less stigmatization of weaker protected groups. In contrast, asymmetrical laws 
may have stigmatic effects and actually increase discrimination. Consider the 
pending Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, which would secure an asymmetric, 
pregnancy-specific right to workplace accommodations.209 I have argued such 
a measure may revitalize exclusionary and paternalistic attitudes toward preg-
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nant employees,210 signal an incapacity to work,211 and increase sex discrimi-
nation.212 In contrast, a symmetrical regime of parental accommodations (that 
encompasses pregnancy) would protect both men and women in their roles as 
parents and aid with both the expressive and tactical dimensions.213 
4. Objections 
One objection to the tactical strengths outlined above is that if a symmet-
rical law is understood or “coded” as serving particular groups, this may un-
dercut the benefits associated with a broader frame. The social and political 
understanding of a law simply may not track its universal form.214 Class-based 
affirmative action may still be seen as a racial remedy215 and universally avail-
able work arrangements and leave policies may still be viewed as a solution for 
female workers.216 
Here, it is critical to consider carefully the type of protection and its social 
context. Some targeted measures are so controversial that a universal or symmet-
rical replacement will still be less controversial—even if the universal or sym-
metrical protection is coded as serving the interests of a particular group.217 Fur-
ther, we might consider whether a symmetrical policy is directly replacing more 
targeted measures.218 If so, the tactical benefits may be muted.219 If not, the 
measure is less likely to be interpreted as targeting only specific groups.220 
Moreover, the benefits of symmetry obtain as long as an employer believes that 
all groups make at least some use of the law.221 There are good reasons to be-
lieve (a) that employers do not actually know if disadvantaged groups make 
more use of certain laws than privileged groups,222 and (b) that employers over-
estimate the proportion of claims brought by advantaged classes.223 
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C. Substantively 
The substantive realm addresses how the symmetrical design of the pro-
tectorate may promote justice. How might symmetrical approaches aid in the 
pursuit of equality or otherwise augment efforts to redress discrimination? 
1. Adaptive Breadth 
One way of analyzing symmetry in the substantive realm is to consider 
how symmetry’s breadth may give it more staying power than tailored 
measures. While it is relatively easy to identify groups who have experienced 
widespread discrimination, it may be difficult to predict exactly which groups 
will need protection from discrimination in the future. In this way, symmetrical 
laws are prophylactic and less likely to require future amendment for the scope 
of the protected class. The symmetry principle may give discrimination laws 
continuity over time since, as new groups face new versions of bigotry on the 
same grounds, there is no need for a new statute.224 
The best example, noted in the Introduction, is Title VII’s protection of 
“sex.”225 While men were likely not seen as having much need for the statute 
when it was passed in 1964, this breadth has had positive unintended conse-
quences. In particular, the protection of simple sex discrimination has evolved 
to provide recourse for sex-based stereotyping, gender non-conformance, and 
sexual harassment. For example, in 1998, the Supreme Court held that same-
sex harassment fell within the protective ambit of Title VII.226 The Court wrote 
that while “male-on-male sexual harassment was assuredly not the principal 
evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII . . . statutory pro-
hibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable 
evils.”227 Had Title VII only protected women, its protections would never 
have reached a sub-class of men who have demonstrably needed protection 
from discrimination.228 
In contrast, asymmetrical statutes are more likely to require amendment 
to ensure they are “broadly remedial.”229 For example, the pre-amendment 
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ADA, as interpreted, involved stark asymmetries between those who were dis-
abled and those who were not.230 Over time, it became increasingly difficult to 
prove that one was disabled, culminating in a state of affairs where over 95% 
of ADA claimants in federal trial courts were losing.231 The result was that 
eighteen years after it was first enacted, the statute had to be amended to dra-
matically broaden the protected class.232 Had the ADA been more broadly re-
medial from the start—perhaps approaching symmetry, as it presently 
does233—the amendment might not have been necessary. 
Even with the most paradigmatic of asymmetrical statutes, the ADEA, 
prophylaxis might have favored a broader crafting when the statute was passed 
in 1967. At the outset, we might ask whether the nature of the harms experi-
enced by younger workers is qualitatively different than the discrimination 
faced by older workers.234 If one reaches the conclusion that both involve the 
same negative impulse—i.e., unguarded stereotyping on the basis of age—it 
would have made prophylactic sense to eliminate all age discrimination at the 
outset. As noted above, there is a growing literature that chronicles how 
younger workers are suffering from stereotypes and discrimination.235 Had the 
ADEA been crafted symmetrically from the beginning, it would now be posi-
tioned well to address new and unanticipated forms of age bias.  
In sum, symmetry may give a law continuity and reach over time, and es-
pecially as new groups requiring protection emerge. As such, symmetry is a 
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“sufficiently absolute” principle that can lift an antidiscrimination measure 
“above the level of the pragmatic political judgments of a particular place and 
time.”236 
2. Challenging Stereotypes 
As Professor Naomi Schoenbaum has pointed out, where a ground con-
tains two principle groups, symmetry may be critical to challenge the stereo-
types associated with the more disadvantaged group.237 Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the case of sex.238 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, for instance, recog-
nized early on the importance of challenging the gender norms imposed on 
men in order to further the equality of women.239 In 1970, Ginsburg made the 
strategic decision, on behalf of the ACLU, to challenge the constitutionality of 
sex-based state action by bringing cases with male plaintiffs.240 Despite her 
successes over the next decade in proving the Fourteenth Amendment reached 
sex discrimination, legal feminists judged Ginsburg harshly for her reliance on 
male plaintiffs.241 They argued she must be satisfied with formal equality and 
failing to understand the limitations of a “sex-blind” doctrine.242 Yet it is illu-
minating to consider who Ginsburg’s plaintiffs were: one was a primary care-
giver to an elderly mother; one, a stay-at-home father; several were men who 
were married to women who were substantial breadwinners.243 Most of them, 
simply put, “failed to satisfy masculine gender norms.”244 Professor Cary 
Franklin argues that Ginsburg’s choice of plaintiffs reflects, among other 
things, her understanding that the subordination of women was tied to mascu-
line gender norms,245 and, thus, the equality of women requires “liberat[ing] 
both sexes from prescriptive sex stereotyping.”246 
Twenty five years later, Professor Mary Anne Case wrote about the role 
of unconventional plaintiffs under Title VII in challenging the rigid gender 
norms that constrain employment opportunities.247 She argued that effeminate 
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men must be able to challenge adverse treatment on the theory that as long as 
men were required to take on masculine roles, one might reasonably suppose 
that feminine traits would continue to be devalued.248 Case presciently argued 
that the statutory language of Title VII was already capacious enough to protect 
both effeminate men and masculine women in their departures from convention-
al gender roles.249 She relatedly pressed the importance of “sex-specific” in-
stances of fashion and conduct, sexual harassment, work that supposedly re-
quires mainly male or female characteristics, “single-sex education,” sexual 
orientation, and transgenderism.250 All such cases held the potential to chal-
lenge the dominant and subversive norms associated with masculinity. 
More can now be said about the theoretical value of symmetry for chal-
lenging stereotypes. First, symmetry appears to hold the most value when it 
comes to challenging stereotypes associated with a ground that has a largely 
binary structure.251 With such traits, it is easy to view one group as the oppo-
site of the other.252 So, for example, to be masculine means to not be femi-
nine253 and to be young means to not embody the traits of those who are old-
er.254 Second, the importance of symmetry for challenging stereotypes is of 
more limited utility when the ground is non-binary. Where there is a multiplici-
ty of groups under a particular trait, no one group is put necessarily into the 
position of the foil for another group.255 
3. Distributive Effects 
Discrimination prevents people from navigating the opportunity structure 
of life. So, one might naturally assume that prohibiting employment discrimi-
nation against certain groups will allow them to more ably traverse work-
related opportunities. In this way, antidiscrimination laws may have positive 
distributive effects on workers by raising their employment levels and wag-
es.256 In theory, this makes sense, but in practice “the actual distributive conse-
quences of a mandate depends on whether it effectively constrains employers 
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from discriminating against the protected group in hiring or pay.”257 In advanc-
ing this argument on distributive effects, Professor Schoenbaum has pointed 
out that “an asymmetrical mandate makes the protected group of workers more 
expensive to employ, which can lead to reduced employment levels and wages 
for these workers.”258 
More to the point, there are stark informational barriers that prevent vic-
tims of discrimination from even detecting and bringing failure to hire claims. 
Any contact between an applicant an employer is “typically fleeting, the even-
tual outcome is unknown to the candidate, and the process itself rarely signals 
exclusionary intent.”259 So victims of hiring discrimination are unlikely to 
know that they have been discriminated against or to have the information to 
prove it. Even if they do bring suit, the numbers show that employment dis-
crimination plaintiffs are wildly unsuccessful.260 Employers may thus be unde-
terred by the prospect of liability and choose to discriminate if they perceive 
the costs of employing a protected individual to outweigh the marginal benefit 
of hiring the best worker. 
Asymmetrical discrimination laws have long been recognized as making 
targeted groups more expensive to employ, which can in turn harm their em-
ployment prospects. The basic economic point is that if you raise the price of a 
good or service, consumers will buy less.261 Nondiscrimination mandates can 
raise the perceived cost of employing groups due to a fear of litigation, as can 
accommodation mandates for which the employer must pay.262 The best exam-
ple is under the ADA, where studies indicate that the employment of people 
with disabilities has fallen since passage of the statute.263 The rationale for this 
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effect is straightforward. Many times, people’s disabilities are visible and other 
times someone may be forced to disclose their disability during the hiring pro-
cess (because, for example, they require a reasonable accommodation to be 
“qualified” under the ADA). At this point, an employer may perceive such an 
applicant to be more expensive to employ and choose not to be constrained by 
the ADA’s mandates. The ADEA has had a similar impact. Initially, the 
ADEA’s distributive effects were favorable, due to the immediate elimination 
of overt age-based discrimination. But over time, the ADEA has been tied to a 
reduction in the employment levels of older workers.264 
Symmetrical laws are well-positioned to mitigate the potential negative 
effects in the distribution of employment.265 This is because if all groups are 
entitled to protection on the basis of a ground, the employer may perceive it to 
be no costlier to employ disadvantaged groups than it is to employ relatively 
advantaged groups. This point is strongest if an employer believes two or more 
groups make similar use of a law. While one might intuit that no reasonable 
employer would think that advantaged groups will use an employment dis-
crimination law as frequently as disadvantaged groups, decisionmakers do not 
have perfect information and lawsuits brought by majority or advantaged 
groups often garner outsized attention.266 
Moreover, the distributive benefits of symmetry hold even if the employer 
believes that disadvantaged groups make more use of the law than others.267 
By invoking the law, a member of the advantaged group increases the “cost of 
employing members of that group,” which “clos[es] the gap between the cost 
of employing the advantaged and disadvantaged groups,” and thus diminishes 
“the disincentive to hire the disadvantaged group.”268 So even if an employer 
believes that women are more likely to sue under a symmetrical regime than 
men, as long as the employer believes men make any use of the law, any cost 
differential between hiring men and women is less than it would be if the stat-
ute only protected women asymmetrically. Symmetry will almost always re-
duce the economic disincentive to hire members of the disadvantaged group. 
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4. Objections 
One substantive objection, which will be explored in much greater detail 
below,269 is that symmetrical laws provide only formal equality. Opponents of 
laws that are symmetrical sometimes argue such measures are fair in form, but 
not result.270 That argument is most pronounced where there is a zero-sum rela-
tionship in protecting one group versus another.271 While symmetry may indeed 
make it difficult or illegal under the law to treat groups differently, this is part of 
the exchange in purchasing the benefits of symmetry. For example, Title VII 
might have been formulated to only protect African Americans from disparate 
treatment, but, arguably, the expressive, tactical, and substantive opportunity cost 
might have been too great. Protecting all races symmetrically from discrimina-
tion has, among other benefits, supported rights talk, while encouraging solidari-
ty; helped maintain a social appetite for Title VII, while avoiding dilution or bal-
kanization; and ensured that other groups such as Hispanics and Native Ameri-
cans are also protected from employment discrimination. Further, protecting all 
races from disparate treatment has had critical distributive effects and allows a 
more comprehensive challenge of racial stereotypes.272 
 
While this Article takes the position that symmetry is useful in many situa-
tions as an antidiscrimination norm, it does not insist on symmetry for all poli-
cies. Any particular measure must be analyzed in its historical, legal, and politi-
cal context. For example, race, sex, and disability are each very different in 
terms of the expressive, tactical, and substantive challenges confronting them. 
The preceding discussion provides a template for analyzing how the shape of the 
protectorate might play a role in affecting the end goals of discrimination law. 
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Figure 1. 
The Case for Symmetry 
 Arguments for Symmetry Objections 
Expressive  Expresses commonality and 
solidarity 
  Affirms the social salience of 
certain grounds and facilitates 
the invocation of rights 
 Waters down a group-specific 
message 
Tactical  Interest convergence by de-
sign 
 Maintains social appetite for 
antidiscrimination measures 
 Minimizes dilution of laws by 
institutions, legislature, and 
judiciary 
 Avoids backlash 
 May still become coded as 
serving particular groups, un-
dercutting tactical strengths 
Substantive  Adaptive breadth ensures 
future responsiveness to sub-
ordination and gives discrimi-
nation law continuity 
 Allows unique challenge to 
stereotypes 
 Better distributive effects 
 Fair in form, but targeted 
forms would more robustly 
address group-specific ine-
qualities 
III. THE CASE FOR ASYMMETRY 
Not all discrimination laws warrant symmetry. Sometimes, antidiscrimi-
nation protections are most sensible as asymmetric measures. This Part will 
describe when and how asymmetry makes sense as a complement to sym-
metry. The following closely-related rationales help explain why, under the 
right circumstances, asymmetrical protections are most effective. Satisfying 
any one of the conditions below is neither necessary nor sufficient to warrant 
asymmetry. Further, although this Part breaks out separately the circumstances 
which may support asymmetrical discrimination laws, the rationales overlap 
and there is no strict boundary between these categories. 
A. Where Traits Are Not Universal 
The first and simplest explanation for why some laws should protect 
asymmetrically is that sometimes the trait we are endeavoring to protect is not 
salient for many or most people. Some asymmetrical protections, such as age, 
could of course be reformulated to protect symmetrically. But in many instanc-
es, it simply does not make sense for the law to protect in a symmetrical way. 
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In these situations, there simply is no sensible cognate group, corresponding to 
the disadvantaged group, to protect. 
For instance, if we place people who require medical leave under the 
FMLA on one side of the centerline, should we also protect people who do not 
require or take medical leave on the other? If we place people with disabilities 
on one side of an imaginary axis, should we also protect people without disa-
bilities? Even if we reimagine the categories as “disability status” or “leave 
status,” it would not make intuitive sense for most people to talk of everyone 
having such “traits.” 
Similarly, if one views the protection of pregnancy as asymmetrical,273 
one may see it as justified. In theory, the PDA could have protected men with 
pregnant partners, but men with pregnant partners are not a socially salient 
group. Moreover, men with pregnant partners were not advocating for protec-
tions when the PDA was passed because they were not facing adverse stereo-
typing or discrimination on that basis. In stark contrast, during the first half of 
the twentieth century, state and local governments passed a myriad of laws 
regulating the work of pregnant women. Such laws “‘protected’ women out of 
good jobs”274 and led many employers to fire “women who became preg-
nant.”275 Accordingly, Congress chose to protect pregnant workers, but not the 
spouses of pregnant workers. 
Protecting pregnant employees through a right to workplace accommoda-
tions, however, might well be achieved symmetrically. Currently, pregnant 
employees have no affirmative right to workplace accommodation under stat-
utes like the ADA, PDA, or FMLA; this is why the media has been abuzz with 
efforts to pass the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA).276 I have previously 
argued in favor of creating a protecting scheme in lieu of the PWFA that would 
accommodate both pregnancy and parental caregiving under the symmetrical 
umbrella of “parental accommodations.”277 So whether one views the protec-
                                                                                                                           
 273 As explained above, the best view of the PDA is to see it as symmetrical, in that it merely 
ensures complete coverage for men and women under “sex.” Supra notes 47–93 and accompanying 
text. 
 274 Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and 
the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 982 (2013). 
 275 Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treat-
ment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 335 (1984–85). 
 276 Areheart, supra note 210, at 1133–41. 
 277 Under a pregnancy-inclusive parental accommodations model, the employee would need to 
show that he or she (1) “has a pregnancy need or compelling parental obligation” that interferes with a 
condition of employment, (2) notified his or her employer of the conflict “if possible,” and (3) was the 
subject of a negative employment action “for failing to comply with the conflicting employment re-
quirement.” Once an employee establishes a prima facie case on these criteria, the employer must 
show it (1) “made a good faith effort to accommodate the employee’s parental obligations,” or (2) 
could not “reasonably accommodate” the parental obligation “without experiencing an undue hard-
ship.” Id. at 1170–71. 
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tion of pregnancy as asymmetrical or symmetrical (on the claim that the PDA 
merely ensures equal coverage under “sex”), accommodation protections could 
still be formulated symmetrically. 
B. Where Groups Are Manifestly Dissimilarly Situated  
Within the Opportunity Structure 
Some laws protect individuals asymmetrically because some groups are 
dissimilarly situated—and sometimes dramatically so. That similarly situated 
persons should be treated the same is an archetypal proposition for thinking 
about unlawful discrimination and the design of the protectorate. Discrimina-
tion laws thus aim to rectify situations where similarly situated persons are 
treated differently. Nevertheless, the utility of this non-specific formulation 
comes quickly to an end.278 
To what extent are people of different races the same? To what extent are 
women similarly situated to men? Professor Cass Sunstein has observed that 
for race, the law concludes, in most instances, that blacks and whites and His-
panics are all similarly situated.279 For sex, the law urges that men and women 
are similarly situated, except for a few circumstances involving past discrimi-
nation or reproductive differences.280 These types of identity may thus natural-
ly invite symmetrical protections. At other times, people are very differently 
situated. In such instances, the law may require that these people be treated 
differently to achieve equality.281 
Sometimes, the opportunity structure is so unequal that it counsels in fa-
vor of extending rights only to one group.282 For example, disability laws ex-
plicitly and implicitly recognize that a variety of barriers—including physical, 
institutional, and attitudinal—in society prevent people with disabilities from 
being similarly situated to those without, when it comes to the structure of op-
portunities.283 This means that people with disabilities must sometimes be 
treated differently (e.g., provide special training or extend an accommodation) 
in order to make them similarly situated for certain purposes, such as employ-
ment. This is why an employer may be required, under the ADA, to provide an 
accommodation for a disabled person even if the accommodation is the only 
                                                                                                                           
 278 See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982) (arguing 
this proposition of equality is empty, in that it necessarily requires further value judgments). 
 279 Sunstein, supra note 12, at 2422–23. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. at 2425. 
 282 See FISHKIN, supra note 30, at 20–22 (arguing antidiscrimination law should be fundamentally 
about ameliorating severe bottlenecks in the structure of opportunity). 
 283 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2012) (identifying barriers for people with disabilities in architec-
ture, transportation, housing, public accommodations, and a host of other arenas). 
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reason the person would be qualified for the job.284 The ADA inherently rec-
ognizes that the opportunity structure in society is unequal for people with dis-
abilities and certain positive rights may be necessary to afford genuine equality 
of opportunity. 
Similarly, race-based affirmative action may be understood as a targeted 
measure to assist in equalizing opportunities for minorities where there is a 
“manifest imbalance” in certain industries or job categories.285 So while race is 
generally treated symmetrically in discrimination laws, affirmative action is a 
limited departure from that norm; it may not displace current workers or be a 
permanent fixture on a firm’s hiring landscape.286 Affirmative action is thus 
designed to open up the opportunity structure to groups who have historically 
been excluded. Symmetry, however, is such a strong norm that whether affirm-
ative action will remain politically viable is an open question.287 
Finally, there may be no better example, of singling out one group for 
protection in furtherance of equalizing opportunities, than the PDA’s protection 
of pregnancy. In the first part of the twentieth century, about half of the states 
had protective labor laws for female workers.288 There were general re-
strictions limiting the number of hours women could work, prohibiting night 
work, and excluding them from hazardous occupations.289 There were also re-
strictions, prohibiting women from working for a period of time before and 
after childbirth.290 Such laws created a “bottleneck” in the opportunity struc-
                                                                                                                           
 284 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining “qualified individual” as one who can perform the essen-
tial functions of a job either with or without an accommodation). 
 285 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208–09 (1979). See generally Establishing Af-
firmative Action Plans, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4(a)–(b) (2017) (discussing the requirements of a 
“[r]easonable self analysis” and “[r]easonable basis” for affirmative action initiatives). 
 286 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (implicitly holding that affirmative action plans may not require the 
discharge of some workers and replace them with others and that they must be a temporary measure). 
 287 Supreme Court decisions, as well as recent arguments that affirmative action will have a future 
sunset, suggests a strong affinity for protecting race symmetrically. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 342–43 (2003) (stating affirmative action must eventually come to an end and suggesting twenty-
five years after Grutter as that end point). The opinion in Grutter is consistent with other Court deci-
sions that have also signaled the importance of ending race-consciousness. City of Richmond v. J. A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510–11 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) 
(plurality opinion); Weber, 443 U.S. at 208–09; Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Comment, Fisher’s Cau-
tionary Tale and the Urgent Need for Equal Access to an Excellent Education, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
185, 186 (2016) (stating that Supreme Court jurisprudence on affirmative action requires it to eventu-
ally come to an end). This affinity is reflected, for example, in Chief Justice Roberts’ statement that 
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality opin-
ion). 
 288 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae, California Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No-85-494), 1986 WL 728369, at *12–13 [hereinafter ACLU 
Brief]. 
 289 Id. 
 290 Williams, supra note 275, at 334. 
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ture for pregnant employees, and more generally, female workers.291 By rede-
fining sex in 1978 to explicitly include pregnancy, childbirth, or related medi-
cal conditions, the PDA gave women hope that they could pass through this 
bottleneck to reach fulfilling opportunities in the employment sector. 
C. Where the Zero-Sum Impact of Protecting Symmetrically  
Subordinates an Already Disadvantaged Group 
All opportunities, including those affiliated with employment, are finite. 
This means that protecting one group from discrimination has the potential to 
impair opportunities for other groups. Symmetrical discrimination laws thus 
always contain the seeds of zero-sum tradeoffs. For example, the ADEA pro-
tects only those over the age of forty, and it only protects them in relation to 
younger workers.292 But if the ADEA were formulated symmetrically to pro-
tect younger workers, it would be illegal to ever prefer older workers. Accord-
ingly, a symmetrical ADEA might usurp opportunities from older workers. 
Still the zero-sum dynamic is more accentuated with some discrimination laws 
than others. 
If the ADA were formulated symmetrically to protect people without dis-
abilities, it would naturally impair opportunities for people with disabilities. 
For example, the ADA requires that employers reasonably accommodate peo-
ple with disabilities, even though the accommodation sought may directly im-
pact other employees. The statute lists “reassignment to a vacant position” as a 
customary reasonable accommodation even though to do so will exclude other 
able-bodied persons from that position.293 Similarly, a disabled person may be 
entitled to “job restructuring” as a reasonable accommodation even if the re-
structuring means that other workers are required to perform tasks that are 
eliminated for the disabled person.294 If the ADA were reformulated to protect 
symmetrically, people without disabilities could argue correctly that they were 
discriminated against by the provision of various reasonable accommodations, 
including the reassignment or restructuring of tasks. Such a right for people 
without disabilities would usurp the current rights of people with disabilities 
under the statute. 
There are also a variety of areas where protecting race symmetrically may 
subordinate already disadvantaged groups. The symmetrical norms of the 
                                                                                                                           
 291 See FISHKIN, supra note 30, at 13 (describing bottlenecks as narrow spaces in the opportunity 
structure through which people must pass if they hope to reach a range of opportunities on the other 
side). 
 292 See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 581, 584 (2004). (stating that an 
employer is not prevented from “favoring an older employee over a younger one” by the ADEA and 
related federal materials and statutes). 
 293 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012). 
 294 See id. 
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Equal Protection Clause, for instance, may sometimes clash with race-based 
(asymmetrical) affirmative action. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, a 
white contractor challenged a federal program that set aside contracts for mi-
nority-owned construction companies.295 The contractor argued that choosing 
the higher bid of the minority-owned company rather than his lower bid violat-
ed the Equal Protection Clause.296 The Court, in a five-to-four vote, held that 
strict scrutiny was warranted and hinted the program was unconstitutional.297 
The critical holding of Adarand was that all laws employing a racial classifica-
tion must undergo strict scrutiny, with no exceptions for benign motives.298 
The Court’s symmetry, in this context, conflicted with the anti-subordination-
related factors, i.e., history of discrimination and political powerlessness.299 
Professor Barbara Flagg has argued that when strict scrutiny is applied 
evenly to all races, it is hard for the state to take even benevolent actions that 
treat people differentially on the basis of race.300 In her view, there are strong 
reasons to care about and prioritize particular groups that have suffered dis-
crimination, are stigmatized, or face the future prospect of structural barri-
ers.301 This may warrant abandoning the current symmetrical treatment of race 
under the Equal Protection Clause and employing heightened scrutiny only 
when a facially neutral practice disadvantages non-whites.302 
Disparate impact jurisprudence is also an area of law that features a clear 
zero-sum relationship in the distribution of opportunities. Assume that two ap-
plicants for a job (Ms. Black and Ms. White) are comparable in many respects 
but must take an employer’s test, which factors largely in the hiring decision. 
Assume further that Ms. Black does poorly relative to Ms. White and that Ms. 
Black is able to show that the test has a disproportionate impact on other black 
applicants, and is not required by business necessity. On these facts, the opera-
tion of disparate impact doctrine might mean eliminating the test and the real-
location of one position from a white applicant to a black applicant.303 In this 
                                                                                                                           
 295 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204–10 (1995). 
 296 Id. at 205–06. 
 297 Id. at 235–36; Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke’s Fate, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 
1745, 1746 n.8 (1996) (stating that the Supreme Court did not rule the program central to Adarand 
unconstitutional, but did remand that issue to the lower court). 
 298 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240–41 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that although the government 
may be acting with the best of intentions, the Constitution does not allow for preferences based on 
race). 
 299 Yoshino, supra note 14, 557–63. 
 300 Flagg, supra note 22, at 969–79. 
 301 Id. at 957. 
 302 Id. at 993–1001 (detailing her proposal); Cedric Merlin Powell, Blinded by Color: The New 
Equal Protection, the Second Deconstruction, and Affirmative Inaction, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 191, 
195–96 (1997) (contesting the Supreme Court’s arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
allow for positive law aimed at remedying racial injustice). 
 303 Primus, supra note 119, at 563–65 (giving a similar example). 
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way, we might see the exercise of disparate impact rights as a reallocation of 
opportunities to some groups at the expense of others. 
Disparate impact is a unique way of redistributing opportunities because 
it looks past facially neutral standards to dig deeper and structurally toward 
substantive equality. While some commentators have argued that disparate im-
pact is not available as a claim for whites,304 many courts have interpreted it to 
give white plaintiffs a remedy.305 Given that we might think of the status quo 
as an environment that already privileges advantaged groups,306 disparate im-
pact might make sense as a doctrine that is only available to groups that have 
historically been disadvantaged. Moreover, because Congress has clearly disa-
vowed any requirement of proportional hiring,307 “it is hard to identify the so-
cial harm that occurs when a practice not intended to be discriminatory has a 
statistically disparate impact on whites.”308 
Making disparate impact asymmetrical might also help resolve the case of 
Ricci v. DeStefano, in which racially attentive efforts were read to be the poten-
tial equivalent of reverse discrimination.309 If disparate impact were refash-
ioned to only protect disadvantaged groups, it might cause the result associated 
with not certifying test results or eliminating certain practices that have a dis-
parate impact appear less discriminatory toward majority groups. In sum, in all 
of these situations, one might view symmetry’s capacity to worsen the relative 
subordination of a disadvantaged group as a reason to depart from the sym-
metry principle. 
 
This Article has thus far endeavored to outline and provide a framework 
for analyzing the stakes associated with protecting all groups, or only some. 
The result is that any particular antidiscrimination policy must be examined 
individually in order to draw a principled conclusion about whether the shape 
of the protectorate should be symmetrical or asymmetrical. 
                                                                                                                           
 304 See Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by 
White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1505–08 (2004) (arguing that the purposes of disparate impact 
doctrine suggest that it is not available for whites, but that an asymmetrical approach would raise 
constitutional concerns). 
 305 Supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 306 Primus, supra note 119, at 524 (arguing that privilege is generational and thus “applying neu-
tral criteria to haves and have-nots alike could help keep blacks an underclass in the workforce even if 
employers held no bias in favor of maintaining that state of affairs.”). 
 307 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2012) (“Preferential treatment not to be granted on account of 
existing number or percentage imbalance.”). 
 308 Primus, supra note 119, at 530. 
 309 Ricci v. DiStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585–86 (2009) (holding that, for Title VII purposes, an 
“employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate impact liabil-
ity” before it engages in “intentional discrimination for the . . . purpose of avoiding or remedying” 
disparate impact discrimination). 
1130 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1085 
IV. THE SYMMETRY PRINCIPLE APPLIED 
This Part will apply the insights from Parts II and III to sketch the argu-
ment that certain laws are rightly, or wrongly, formulated. This section is not 
intended to be exhaustive or cover every discrimination law canvassed in this 
Article. Several examples will suffice to illustrate symmetry’s import for cur-
rent policy, including a few areas that warrant change. 
A. Laws Warranting Symmetry 
It may be most helpful to first return to a trait that is quintessentially suit-
ed for symmetrical protection: sex. Sex is universally held and performed 
(gender), making it facially fitting for symmetrical treatment. The symmetrical 
framing of sex has also positively aided in a variety of substantive outcomes. 
These include its elasticity in protecting various permutations of gender and 
sex,310 its ability to assist in challenging stereotypes,311 and its likelihood to 
have more positive distributive effects.312 Moreover, protecting women asym-
metrically has historically had regressive effects because to do so often type-
casts women as physically weaker or implicitly connects their worth more with 
home than with work.313 Such measures may then underscore stereotypes and 
further increase the likelihood of future discrimination.314 Finally, sex is an 
area where the concerns of goodwill, backlash, and interest convergence all 
countenance in favor of symmetrical protections. 
Age is also well suited for symmetry. While the ADEA only protects 
those over the age of forty, this Article’s analytical framework supports refash-
ioning the law to symmetrically protect all employees on the basis of age. Be-
ginning with the conditions that may support asymmetry, age is a universal 
trait and there is no fundamental dissimilarity between a worker who is thirty-
fice and one who is forty-five. Further, giving younger workers a nondiscrimi-
nation right does not engender an unacceptable risk of further subordinating 
older workers, in part because they are not all that subordinated to start. Far 
from being a “discrete and insular” minority, older Americans generally are not 
impoverished or afflicted by disabling social stigmas.315 Moreover, older 
Americans have a disproportionate share of wealth and political power, leading 
                                                                                                                           
 310 See supra notes 1–30 and accompanying text. 
 311 See supra notes 237–255 and accompanying text. 
 312 See supra notes 256–268 and accompanying text.  
 313 ACLU Brief, supra note 288, at *17–19. 
 314 See supra notes 256–268 and accompanying text (referencing “Distributive Effects”); see also 
Areheart, supra note 210, at 1166 (arguing pregnancy-specific right to accommodation will increase 
discrimination). 
 315 Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination?: 
The ADEA’s Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 781 (1997). 
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some economists to call the ADEA, and especially its elimination of mandato-
ry retirement, a textbook case of “rent-seeking.”316 
The benefits of symmetry also strongly support protecting age symmetri-
cally. Broadening the ADEA to protect all employees on the basis of age would 
give the statute permanent adaptive breadth, obviating the need to reconsider 
the appropriate age threshold every time there are cultural changes, such as 
increases in longevity or the emergence of industries that prefer older work-
ers.317 As noted above, workers of all ages encounter stereotypes and millenni-
als are no exception; certain industries, such as television broadcasting and 
start-ups, are worse offenders than others.318 Protecting symmetrically would 
also reduce any negative distributive effects on workers over the age of 40.319 
Further, protecting symmetrically may be critical to challenge the stereotypes 
associated with older workers. Much as in the case of sex,320 age is commonly 
understood as a binary trait (old and young), with both groups facing corre-
sponding stereotypes.321 Older workers may be seen as less flexible or more 
resistant to change, while younger workers are viewed as too flexible and less 
committed.322 A symmetrical law allows these stereotypes to be challenged 
from both vantage points. 
Genetic information also warrants symmetrical treatment and for many of 
the same reasons profiled above. GINA signals our common humanity, while 
equipping people with the language of rights, which can raise employers’ con-
sciousness about the impropriety of using this information to distinguish be-
tween employees. GINA is different from other protected classes, in that it is 
missing the history of discrimination that precipitated passage of Title VII, the 
ADEA, and the ADA.323 Its findings section, for example, cites only one spe-
cific example of genetic discrimination in the workplace324 and, instead, focus-
es on allaying fears related to “the potential for discrimination.”325 These facts 
most explain the universal scope of GINA’s protectorate. Still, this symmet-
rical formulation is prophylactic and elastic, ensuring that GINA will have 
traction and continuity over time. GINA is also unlikely to prompt backlash or 
dilute goodwill, in part due to structural interest convergence and in part due to 
                                                                                                                           
 316 Id. at 783, 820–30. 
 317 See supra notes 224–236 and accompanying text (referring to “Adaptive Breadth”).  
 318 See supra notes 158–162 and accompanying text (discussing objections to the “expressive 
strengths” of symmetry). 
 319 See supra notes 256–268 and accompanying text (referring to “Distributive Effects”). 
 320 See supra notes 236–254 and accompanying text (referring to “Challenging Stereotypes”). 
 321 Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 100–01. 
 322 Id. at 100. 
 323 Areheart, supra note 65, at 985. 
 324 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 
(2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, 42 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 325 Id. 
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the fact that no one expects litigation under it to overwhelm the judiciary any 
time soon.326 
B. Laws Warranting Asymmetry 
 Disability is a justified departure from the dominant norm of symmetry. 
First, disability, perhaps more than other areas of identity, is least intelligible as 
a symmetrical protection.327 At best, the ADA could be reformulated to protect 
all mental or physical “traits,” but that would entail a full-scale acceptance of 
protection from appearance discrimination—something society has not yet 
proven willing to do. 
Second, there is a manifest difference in the way people with disabilities 
are situated from those without disabilities with respect to work. Even where 
an employer has no discernible bias toward people with disabilities, the built 
environment itself excludes.328 Indeed, when Congress passed the original 
ADA it highlighted the “discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, 
and communication barriers.”329 Additionally, people with disabilities have 
been heavily stigmatized for centuries and across different cultures.330 
Throughout history, people with disabilities have been “shunted aside, hidden, 
and ignored.”331 People with a wide variety of impairments have been segre-
gated in a “collection of congregate institutions,” perpetuating the idea that 
people with disabilities are incapable of participating in community life.332 
And even non-institutionalized disabled people rarely worked or patronized 
businesses.333 As noted above, we must sometimes treat people with disabili-
ties differently through the provision of reasonable accommodation to achieve 
genuine equality of opportunity. 
Third, protecting symmetrically would yield an enfeebled ADA since giv-
ing able-bodied persons a reverse cause of action would inevitably undercut 
                                                                                                                           
 326 Cf. What You Should Know: Questions and Answers About the Genetic Information Nondis-
crimination Act (GINA) and Employment, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.
gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/gina_nondiscrimination_act.cfm [https://perma.cc/X4D6-HSFM] (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2017) (stating that since its enactment, 700 charges have been brought under GINA 
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 327 Supra notes 274–277 and accompanying text. 
 328 Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.11 (2004) 
(defining the “built environment” as physical edifices that are not wheelchair accessible and “the 
rules, policies, and practices” that provide a social framework which does not account for all kinds of 
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 329 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2012). 
 330 Areheart, supra note 210, at 1149–54. 
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many of the accommodations the law stipulates as reasonable. As noted above, 
the reassignment and job restructuring accommodations are both ones that re-
quire tradeoffs in the treatment of people with and without disabilities. If the 
ADA were reformulated symmetrically, people without disabilities could win 
the argument that they were discriminated against in the extension of such ac-
commodations. 
The ADA as currently constituted is already less exclusionary than it oth-
erwise might be. As noted in Part I, the ADA protects people without disabili-
ties from discrimination due to a mistakenly perceived disability, because of 
their relationship with someone who is disabled, or for opposing conduct that 
violates the statute.334 Moreover, the 2008 ADA Amendments Act vastly ex-
panded the scope of the disability protectorate, leading some commentators to 
discuss the statute as approaching universality.335 
There is also a variety of race-based protections that warrant asymmetric 
treatment. While race is a universally held trait, there are several doctrines 
where protecting race symmetrically may subordinate already disadvantaged 
groups. Scholars have for decades argued in favor of abandoning the current 
symmetrical treatment of race under the Equal Protection Clause and employ-
ing heightened scrutiny only when a state takes action that subordinates.336 In 
one of the pioneering works on the subject, Professor Ruth Colker argues that 
the value of antisubordination warrants abandoning the symmetrical treatment 
under the Equal Protection Clause.337 Under her formulation, a state actor 
could always use “facially differentiating policies to redress subordination.”338 
In effect, she is proposing that state action be evaluated asymmetrically de-
pending upon whether the impacted race or sex has a history of subordination. 
She argues the antisubordination perspective is consistent with the Equal Pro-
tection Clause’s history and that understanding the doctrine through the lens of 
antisubordination would provide state actors more flexibility to make use of 
race or sex-specific remedies.339 Colker further argues this change in constitu-
tional doctrine is necessary as a matter of substantive justice given the difficul-
                                                                                                                           
 334 Supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
 335 See, e.g., Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism: What the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Can 
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1001 (detailing her proposal). 
 337 See generally Ruth Colker, Anti-subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986) (advocating adopting an antisubordination instead of antidifferentiation 
approach in equal protection jurisprudence). 
 338 Id. at 1015. 
 339 Id. at 1013–14. 
1134 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1085 
ty, demonstrated throughout history, in achieving true equality through race- 
and sex-neutral measures.340 
Similarly, given the zero-sum distribution of opportunities via disparate 
impact jurisprudence,341 it might be reasonably reformulated to protect only 
those groups that have historically been disadvantaged.342 While less common, 
it is not hard to imagine facially neutral policies that might aid minorities, 
while disproportionately disadvantaging white workers. For example, reduc-
tions in force, which often disproportionately impact older workers could be 
reframed as disadvantaging whites.343 Similarly, city policies in very urban 
areas that restrict employment to residents might also disparately impact Cau-
casian workers.344 While symmetrically giving white workers a remedy in such 
situations would remove any advantage non-white workers might have—in 
effect, disadvantaging them—many of the benefits associated with symmetry 
simply do not apply. There are no stereotypes, for instance, uniquely chal-
lenged through a “reverse” disparate impact cause of action, nor do the expres-
sive and tactical concerns seem as weighty given that disparate impact applies 
only to facially neutral standards and practices. 
Finally, at certain times and in certain places and industries, there is a 
manifest difference in the relationship different races have to employment. In 
the run-up to Donald Trump’s recent election, racial inequities and divisions 
have been pronounced and heightened. It is hard for many to recall a time 
where racial injustice has been more on display than the present.345 There is 
widespread police brutality toward African Americans, heightened and divisive 
rhetoric directed toward Muslims and Mexicans, and ongoing school and hous-
ing segregation.346 Much more is known about implicit bias and the way in 
which it can “predict racial disparities in employment.”347 It is clear we have 
not reached a point where race no longer has an outsized effect in the distribu-
tion of opportunities.348 The project of building a more just opportunity struc-
                                                                                                                           
 340 Id. at 1013. 
 341 Supra note 303 and accompanying text. 
 342 See supra notes 303–308 and accompanying text (discussing disparate impact jurisprudence as 
a system of reallocating opportunities). 
 343 Sullivan, supra note 304, at 1509–11 (observing that the increase of women and minorities in 
the workforce over the past four decades has resulted in an older workforce that is “disproportionately 
white and male in many [areas]”). 
 344 Id. at 1509. 
 345 See Elise C. Boddie, The Future of Affirmative Action, 130 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 38, 38 
(2016), http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Forum_Vol.130_Boddie.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B942-6PE3]. 
 346 See id. at 38–39 (chronicling “problems of racial injustice”). 
 347 See L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the Criminal Courtroom, 
126 YALE L.J. 862, 876 (2017) (“[A] meta-analysis of 122 implicit bias studies found evidence that 
implicit racial biases predict racial disparities in employment and healthcare.”). 
 348 See Cho, supra note 20, at 1593 (arguing “post-racialism” is a “dangerous ideology”). 
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ture “requires a measure of intentionality that only affirmative action can de-
liver.”349 Accordingly, we might reasonably see asymmetry in the form of race-
based affirmative action as warranted to help ameliorate the structural disad-
vantage that certain minorities have historically faced, and continue to face. 
Figure 2. 
Application to Select Statutes 
 Symmetry Warranted Asymmetry Warranted 
Law is Currently Symmetrical  Sex (Title VII)  
 Genetic Information (GINA) 
 Race (Equal Protection Clause) 
 Race (Disparate Impact under 
Title VII) 
Law is Currently Asymmetrical  Age (ADEA) 
 
 Disability (ADA) 
 Race-Based Affirmative Ac-
tion 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the symmetry principle is one of the prevail-
ing antidiscrimination norms. Symmetry has long been hidden in plain sight 
and is distinct from other major normative theories. This Article has made the 
case for a presumption in favor of protecting symmetrically in situations where 
a ground is universally held. There will often be sufficient expressive, tactical, 
and substantive benefits, associated with protecting all groups, to justify the 
measure. 
Despite these strengths, it is not always sensible or desirable to protect 
symmetrically. This Article has identified a few situations where asymmetrical 
laws may be more justified. Sometimes, the protection is most intelligible 
when formulated asymmetrically due to lack of a cognate group or groups be-
ing differently situated within the relevant opportunity structure. At other 
times, the zero-sum impact of protecting symmetrically would further subordi-
nate in a way that warrants asymmetry. 
We need both symmetrical and asymmetrical approaches to comprehen-
sively combat discrimination, because discrimination laws have different pur-
poses and involve qualitatively different types of identity. This Article has 
sought to install an analytical framework to guide legislative bodies in design-
ing antidiscrimination protections in a rapidly evolving society. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 349 Boddie, supra note 345, at 39. 
  
 
